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ABSTRACT 
Over-the-counter (OTC) financial derivatives are increasingly used in a 
globalising financial market as tools for risk management.  However, the advent 
of large financial crises as a result of their use raises issue as to the risks 
derivatives themselves might pose to the players who use them, as well as to the 
international financial system as a whole.  It is, therefore, a key question to ask 
what regulation might be apt for trade in OTC derivatives.  This thesis considers 
how a post-structuralist account might offer important insight into how this 
question is understood.  Post-structuralist, as well as broader social constructivist 
and non-rationalist critiques help illustrate some of the limits to objectivist 
rationalism in practices of financial risk management.  This thesis argues that the 
danger of ignoring such critiques include a continued “illusion” of individual and 
state-actor control over macro-economic processes, such as the phenomenal 
volume of trade in OTC derivatives contracts today.  In this light, therefore, the 
regulation of OTC derivatives is not just a political question of who does and 
should have explicit policy control over economic and regulatory processes; but it 
is also a political question over knowledge constructs, and how particular 
technologies and specialist discourses are developed that enable “experts” 
legitimacy and power where it is not necessarily justified. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
HOW SHOULD THE QUESTION OF REGULATING OTC 
DERIVATIVES BE FRAMED? 
Trade in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives now accounts for nearly $US2 
trillion per day in international financial transactions.1
                                                 
1 Statistics as at the final quarter of 2003 according to the Bank of International Settlements.  See Bank of 
International Settlements, September, BIS Quarterly Review, Geneva.  Note that this value is calculated in 
notional amounts.  See notes to report on p. A108. 
  Increasingly abstracted 
from real commodities and securities, such as those assets that are actually traded 
and consumed, the value of these financial instruments is the subject of much 
speculation.  Derivatives are noted by proponents for their impressive function of 
limiting the risks a company is exposed to, providing a kind of insurance policy 
against various forms of market uncertainty.  Critics, however, point out that 
OTC derivatives in particular are not only used to offset risk, but are in fact 
exploited as tools for speculation on future prices driven by “healthy desires for 
profit”, showing little regard to the various social, economic, environmental and 
political costs that may ensue.  For example, large financial crises such as those of 
Barings Bank, Long-Term-Capital-Management (LTCM), Orange County and 
Enron, have had both catastrophic impact for each organisation as well as 
significant impacts on associated workers, bank and credit networks, and 
government expenditure and investment plans (such as superannuation funds, for 
example) – in other words: the wider international financial system and beyond.  
Furthermore, OTC derivatives – by definition, those outside of formal exchanges 
– are such an obvious focus for financial speculation due to the lack of any real 
systematic regulation of their use.  Regulation of OTC derivatives does exist, 
though a culture of “self-regulation” is prevalent due to the predominance of 
5 
neo-liberal logic, and the liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets that 
follows from this. 
 
The most significant concern raised by global trade in OTC derivatives (i.e. trade 
that is across national boundaries and encompassing a multitude of currency and 
credit networks) is that of systemic risk.  A concern with systemic risk is a 
concern over the role OTC derivatives trading might play in the occurrence of 
not only large corporations over-extending themselves and becoming bankrupt, 
but also the follow-on effects such an event might have for the entire 
international financial system.  The likelihood of such an event is increased due to 
the large volumes of trade that exist between a relatively small number of tightly 
interconnected financial players.  Also, because the financial system is no longer 
just a national one, nor even one between a small number of states, systemic risk 
is a truly important concern for the global financial market and the vast array of 
world affairs that are tied up with these processes.  A key question has therefore 
been raised, by those across the political spectrum, as to the apt regulation of 
OTC derivatives trading.  This thesis explores the question of whether OTC 
derivatives should be regulated, and how they should be regulated. 
 
This is not a question ignored by scholars of international political economy 
(IPE), as the international financial sector and its abstract, but all too real, power, 
is considered a subject of critical importance.  However, many conventional IPE 
accounts of international financial markets treat them as an homogenous external 
force that constrains policy devices in a straightforward way, rendering the matter 
of “finance” a set and neatly bounded subject to be studied as separate from 
wider politico-strategic, politico-social, and even other politico-economic 
processes.  Many “new” scholars of IPE argue that the comprehensive nature and 
impact of this subject make it one that deserves better cultural, political and 
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social, as well as economic, understanding, than it often receives in the more 
“orthodox” accounts (taken here to be predominantly neo-liberal and neo-realist) 
from scholars of IPE and economics. 
 
Trade in OTC derivatives provides an important case where more socially 
constructivist accounts prove fruitful in terms of understanding the nature of 
human behaviour.  Take, for instance, the question of systemic risk raised above.  
This question of systemic risk is not ignored by orthodox economists and 
political economists, and, in fact, their analyses become highly sophisticated, in 
many instances utilising complex mathematical formula and statistical modelling 
to outline what hypothetical situations might lead to systemic collapse.  For 
example, there has been much discussion and analysis of “contagion” in the 
“Asian Financial Crisis” of 1997, and the spectacular demise of the “superstar” 
hedge fund LTCM has received much attention from IPE scholars also.  
However, an important question remains as to whether such systemic risks can 
actually be known, or predictable, in a calculable sense.  This is partly an 
epistemological query over the nature of social practices in global finance, and 
how these processes might be rendered knowable, calculable, and therefore 
predictable.  Without rushing into the intricate methodological debates that exist 
within the discipline of IPE, however, it is clear that how the “risks” in 
derivatives trading are understood is a key point to assess.  Therefore, because 
there is contention over what kind of knowledge is to best allow us to explain and 
understand the social interactions that make up the complicated world of global 
derivatives markets, the question over who is “expert” in this field, and whose 
knowledge is to be relied on for questions of regulation, are also key queries that 
need raising. 
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IPE does offer many interesting and insightful contributions to understanding 
financial practices and their roles in broader politico-economic practices.  
However, until recently a serious gap in the literature has existed with regard to 
the notion of “risk”. 
 
Before assessing the IPE literature that exists on this subject, however, we need 
to better understand the relevance of the theoretical debate that exists between 
“rationalist” and “non-rationalist” (note: not anti-rationalist) accounts of IPE, by 
understanding the context to the academic discipline of IPE and IR more 
generally.  It is important to do so, as the way in which this discipline has 
developed provides the basis for what questions are asked and how it is deemed 
best to answer them.   
 
The modernist context 
One consequence of the way modernist society has developed is that modernist 
thinkers have divided various social processes into different groups, such as 
politics, sociology and economics.  Perhaps the ultimate modernist example of 
this search for a rational and total way of mapping knowledge comes from the 
great Enlightenment project, the Encyclopedie, edited by Diderot and d’Alambert 
and supported by the intellectual weight of eighteenth-century French 
philosophes.23
                                                 
2 See, for instance, J. L. R. d'Alambert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot, trans. Richard N. Scwab 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
  As they struggled to map all knowledge according to what they 
believed to be the “natural” division of the faculties of the mind, they displayed 
the extreme faith that many have in the power of rationalist ways of knowing to 
3 There is some disagreement over when exactly the period of modernity (if it can indeed be described as a 
discrete period) “began”, and some argue that the European Enlightenment precedes modernity proper.  
However, this author takes the view that the development of rationalist ways of knowing in the 
Enlightenment (and preceding it) provide core philosophical and cultural components of modernist 
practices. 
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provide an objective and true account of the world “out there”.  They failed, as 
the task they set themselves was incredibly far-reaching for the time (and arguably 
too far-reaching for any time), but the intellectual search for the way to explain the 
world around us has continued, and the key legacy of the Enlightenment search 
for truth has continued in this modernist division of academic labour.4
 
 
The above-mentioned intellectual division of labour has become one of the 
defining features of the way modernist thinkers attempt to explain and 
understand their respective “areas of expertise”.  Therefore, rather than look at 
world affairs as a whole set of interrelated practices, which would indeed be 
confusing and would provide less “clarity” than this kind of focus brings, specific 
analytic languages have been developed that focus and specialise their search for 
“truth”. 
 
It is out of this intellectual history that the study of international relations (IR) has 
developed as a discipline.  This discipline focuses primarily on the politico-
strategic dimension to world affairs, that is, the nature of power and how it is 
exercised by state-actors.  The dominant voices in the discipline have traditionally 
been realist (those who understand human nature in essentially pessimistic terms) 
and idealist/internationalist (who understand human nature in essentially 
calculating terms) accounts.5
 
 
By focusing so heavily on state actors in their pursuit of explanations for war and 
peace, realist and idealist scholars neglected a whole range of non-state actors, as 
                                                 
4 See Milbank for an account of the religious context that this division of labour has developed out of in the 
Western tradition. J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell, 1990; reprint, 1994).  Also see  
5 For an account of the methodological history of the discipline of IR, see M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining 
and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 
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well as politico-economic and politico-social processes.  It was not until the 1970s 
that the study of international political economy (IPE) began to gain traction in 
IR circles as an important complement to and component of a comprehensive 
explanation of international political processes.6
 
  The result was not so much a 
rejection of realist and idealist theories, but rather a modification of these theories 
to include economic factors in their consideration of the decision-making 
processes of states. 
There are two key points to note here.  First, academic study of world affairs has 
become more specialised and focused on specific “problems” that are viewed to 
have more in common than other problems.  For instance, “power” (understood 
primarily in material and coercive terms) has been considered the key aspect that 
defines the study of politics, as opposed to that of wealth and scarcity in 
economics.  Second, the study of international relations, along with much else 
endeavour in the social sciences, has seen a dramatic shift to reliance on what can 
be called “rationalist” ways of knowing.  This shift relies on the epistemological 
belief that “science” should underpin all social enquiry, providing verifiable 
knowledge that lays the foundation for a more “objective” understanding of the 
world “out there”, a theoretical position mapped out by Descartes and developed 
according to his objectivist and enumerated principles some four hundred years 
earlier7
                                                 
6 Gill and Law are correct to assert that political economy has long been an important component to Western 
accounts of world affairs, an intellectual history that precedes the discipline of IR altogether.  S. Gill and D. 
Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems, and Policies (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1988) p. 3.  However, for an account of more recent developments of the discipline of IPE, see S. 
Strange, "Political Economy and International Relations," in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken 
Booth and Steve Smith (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 
.  The study of IR, and the sub-discipline of IPE it has spawned, are 
tantamount to the methodological dominance of objectivist rationalism.  A brief 
7 R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. John Veitch (London and New York: J. M. Dent, Dutton, 1975). 
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analysis of the IPE literature makes clear what types of questions and enquiry this 
type of analysis leads to, and consequently, what questions it does not ask. 
 
Theorising IPE 
So, what has been the contribution to the discipline from the scholars of IPE?  
For starters, we can divide most of the IPE literature into two broad groups of 
“traditional” approaches and “new” approaches.8  The traditional approaches are 
the “trusty trio” of liberalism, mercantilism and Marxism.  The most prominent 
of these voices are those belonging to the liberals who support a “free market” 
model, viewing free trade and the free movement of capital as essential to the 
functioning of “fair” and “efficient” markets.9  According to liberal logic, ‘[t]he 
economy is oiled by freely exchangeable currencies and open markets which 
create a global system of prices which, like an invisible hand, ensures an efficient 
and equitable distribution of goods and services across the world economy.’10
 
  
For liberals, the assumption that people are to be understood as rational self-
maximising individuals is paramount. 
Liberals of all kinds are concerned about “market failure” and the economic 
depression that might result.  Financial poverty and uncertainty is also likely to 
manifest itself in internal and international conflict, and can affect the collective 
security pacts that concern liberal internationalists, and the interdependent 
economic relations that concern liberal institutionalists.  Whatever liberal 
approach is adopted (moderate or extreme), individual actors, such as the firm, 
are the key.  Any rational description of economic processes must take seriously 
                                                 
8 N. Woods, "International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization," in The Globalization of World Politics, 
ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 285. 
9 See, for instance, J. G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic Order," International Organizations 36, no. 2 (1982).  
10 Woods, "International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization," p. 285. 
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the motivations of the individual firms involved, primarily in terms of the 
monetary incentives to which they respond. 
 
The mercantilist’s focus, by contrast, is still very much that of the state.  For 
mercantilists, supra-territorial financial capital is potentially a “threat” to state 
autonomy.  Hegemonic stability theory looms large here, as the importance of 
international economic processes is to be understood in terms of the “balance of 
power” that it is part of.  Without cash, governments cannot buy military 
capabilities, which are necessary in a zero-sum world of self-interested state actors 
– the key assumption of realists and mercantilists alike.  
 
Marxists are, like mercantilists, sceptical of the positive-sum game put forward by 
liberals.  But unlike realists, whose main actor is that of the state, Marxists 
emphasise the class struggle that is part and parcel of capitalist processes.  
Following the logic of historical materialism, financial instruments such as 
derivatives are viewed as tools to be used by bourgeois elites to further the 
expansion of capitalist markets, and to “exploit” the value found in all labour 
practices.  It is no surprise, then, that those who trade in financial derivatives are 
primarily viewed by Marxists in parasitic terms, as providing little, if any, creative 
input to economic processes.   
 
The upside for Marxists is that a historical materialist analysis leads one to 
“realise” the unsustainable nature of capitalist processes.  The further the 
expansion of capitalism and its reliance on abstract notions of value, the more 
imminent the “inevitable” collapse of the entire financial system.  Regardless of 
one’s political perspective, the Marxists’ focus on financial capitalism at the 
systemic level of analysis, provides some credence given the global nature of the 
processes involved. 
12 
 
The “new” approaches to the study of IPE build on these traditional approaches, 
by incorporating the results of methodological debates within the discipline over 
how the motivations of actors (as well as which actors are to be considered 
important) are to be understood and explained.  The new approaches can be 
broadly categorised as rationalist, like neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and social 
constructivist, like critical theory and neo-gramscianism. 
 
Ronen Palan notes the ‘rising in significance of the methodological debate 
between, on the one hand, rationalist and methodologically individualist 
approaches, and on the other, the critical or post-rationalist traditions.’11  A key 
point raised by the post-rationalist tradition, is that the distinction between the 
political and the economic is not as clear as theorists such as Gilpin have made 
out. This is due to substantial changes due to a ‘profound restructuring of the 
environment of accumulation through economic globalisation.’12
 
 
The two main rationalist approaches to the study of IPE are the neorealist and 
neoliberal takes, such as those of Krasner13 on the one hand, and of Cohen, 
Cerny and Pauly on the other.14
                                                 
11 R. Palan, ed., Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 2. 
  Both of these accounts have refined their 
technical analysis of the behaviour of their respective actors, with the main 
assumption being that individuals act according to laws of utility-maximising self-
interest.  Importantly, for neo-liberal theory, ‘the state is disaggregated while 
12 Ibid. p. 3. 
13 S. Krasner, "The Accomplishments of International Political Economy," in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
This particular article outlines both the position of Krasner’s own neo-realist work as well as other 
predominantly rationalist accounts of IPE. 
14 B. Cohen, "Money in a Globalized World," in The Political Economy of Globalization, ed. Ngaire Woods (New 
York: St Martins Press, 2000). 
13 
normative consideration of system optimisation through the tools of rational 
choice is advanced.’15
 
  
Three main criticisms to these rationalist approaches are outlined in approaches 
that emphasise epistemic communities16, Gramscian IPE17, and the importance 
of information18.  Other reasons for challenging these dominant discourses of 
rationalist accounts include the numerous voices that are not heard through their 
analysis of the global political economy.  For instance, the gendered nature of the 
global political economy, such as the masculinist financial practices and female 
under-representation that are evident in popular accounts, like the non-fiction 
book Liar’s Poker and the fictional movies of Wall Street and American Psycho.19  
Environmentalists also note the inattention ecological concerns receive in the 
constant call for economic growth through increased production and 
consumption of non-renewable (and often non-recyclable) resources.20
 
 
There is also a growing literature establishing a post-rationalist approach to IPE, 
or GPE (global political economy as it is termed by authors such as Palan and 
Peterson). 
                                                 
15 Palan, ed., Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories p. 6. 
16 E. Helleiner, States and the Re-emergence of Global Finance (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
17  
18 T. Porter, States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993).  And more recently, T. 
Porter, "The Late-Modern Knowledge Structure and World Politics," in Approaches to Global Governance, ed. 
Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, SUNY series in Global Politics (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1999), S. Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1997). 
19 Important feminist contributions to IPE include C. Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of 
International Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), V. S. Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of 
Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive, and Virtual Economies (London: Routledge, 2003). 
20 Nor are these voices particularly new.  See, for instance, E. F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: A Study of 
Economics as if People Mattered (London: Vintage, 1973).  
14 
Broadly speaking, post-rationalist GPE adopts an open-ended historical 
narrative in which outcomes are not predictable, but negotiated and contested, 
with each actor-network perpetually frightened of loss or stasis.  States and 
multinational enterprises are viewed no longer simply as instrumentalist 
advantage-maximising institutions, but as complex organisations which exceed 
their goals and functions, but in non-utilitarian ways.  Their language, their 
scripts, their histories, their techno-structures and artefacts matter; analysis of 
which reveals them to be trapped in their own evolutionary logic but also 
constantly at work to renew themselves.  Consequently, we have witnessed the 
“opening up” of GPE from its economistic and material base to broader 
questions of history and culture.21
 
 
Key to all of this debate is the issue of what questions IPE should address.  Palan 
also notes that “three crucial questions” of political economy are those relating to 
power, capital and labour.  He argues that, ‘[m]ore than any other branch of 
political economy, GPE centres on power, and yet, it does not really know how 
to conceptualise power.’22
                                                 
21 Palan, ed., Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories p. 15. 
  The notion of power is one that post-structuralists are 
particularly interested, though the type of power they focus on has more to do 
with the relationship between knowledge and constructed social practices than it 
does with physical force or outright coercion.  The importance of this analysis lies 
in its recognition of not just the continually politically contested nature of global 
social structures, but it also provides insight into the limits of more rationalist 
accounts.  This is not to reject that rationalist accounts offer powerful 
explanatory tools, but it does argue that these explanations have their limits, and 
that the meaning of such social practices is often overlooked and misunderstood.  
Importantly, this meaning is crucial to understand, if one believes an 
epistemologically constructed interpretation is apt.  Post-structuralists consider 
22 Ibid. p. 4. 
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such an investigation apt due to the contested nature of truth-claims, that rely 
heavily on the connection of particular types of knowledge (such as statistical 
knowledge and mathematical models) and hierarchical positions of decision-
makers.  In the global political economy, the question of power is so important 
due to the global scope and nature of the impact the decision of such a relatively 
few can have. 
 
The point of a postmodernist account is to turn reason back on itself.23
[w]e need to think more productively about: the world as the economic unit, 
information and signs as what is exchanged, and the meaning and value of 
exchanges that are virtual but systematically consequential.  At the same time, we 
need to be able to link the exchange of symbols and intangibles to expectations, 
identities, and practices of the virtual economy and relate these to the productive 
and reproductive economies.
  
Postmodernists believe that reason gets caught up in its own logic.  To the 
postmodernist, truth is essentially relative and depends on the socio-cultural 
context and perspective one has.  Going too far down this path can lead to a 
point of no return, a point where one is no longer able to verify any “truth” 
whatsoever.  Stopping short of this point, however, valuable lessons can be 
gained.  In the study of IPE, this means that  
24
 
 
As Peterson notes, the ‘role of subjective opinions in financial matters is hardly 
new, though (beyond a narrow construction of “rationality”) it has rarely been a 
focal point of liberal and/or positivist analyses.’25
                                                 
23  
  This is particularly important 
for our understanding of derivatives trading, where abstract contracts are 
24 Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive, and Virtual Economies 
pp. 115-116. 
25 Ibid. p. 115. 
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contingent on shared meanings of value.  Indeed, ‘most scholars writing on global 
finance do so from positivist, productivist, or constructivist orientations that tend 
to marginalize subjectivities, signs, and semiotics’26
 
. 
Post-structuralist and social constructivist27
 
 accounts offer a very different and 
critical position in this regard, arguing that neo-liberal and neo-realist approaches 
make false distinctions between “fact” and “value”, and ignore the 
power/knowledge relationships that exist at the heart of all modernist social 
practices.  Their critique of what are essentially viewed as “positivist” accounts of 
global finance, points to the limits of scientific risk management in areas of social 
processes where theory informs practice such that mathematical models and 
statistical knowledge become part of and alter the practices of global finance.  In 
the case of derivatives trading, models such as the Black-Scholes options-pricing 
formula influence the behaviour of financial traders.  This, in itself, does not 
present a fundamental problem to “positivist” risk analyses.  But, it does belie the 
importance of understanding social processes in their cultural and social context.  
If, as post-structuralists suggest, theory does inform practice through a complex 
nexus of power/knowledge relations (such as those that exist between the 
construction of statistical knowledge, issues of classification, interpretive 
representation of  social processes presented as social “fact”, education of 
“experts” and the construction of a technocratic society that supports their 
legitimacy, and that legitimacy as viewed to be based on their superior apolitical 
and objective knowledge, as opposed to knowledge that might be political and 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 This is a very broad category in IR/IPE theory, and includes those from more “soft” rational choice camps 
as well as other more radical constructivist approaches.  For instance, see J. K. Jacobsen, "Much Ado 
About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," World Politics 47, no. 2 (1995), M. Laffey and J. 
Weldis, "Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations," 
European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 2 (2000). 
17 
with vested interest),  then the position of the “expert” in scientific financial risk 
management might well be undermined.  Interestingly, in this regard, is that there 
is a ‘curious inattentiveness to the question of risk’28
 
 in IPE. 
While much of the IPE literature offers criticisms of economic and financial 
practices, these criticisms are limited by those “facts” that are taken as given, 
those arguments that are taken as “truths”.  A genealogy of finance and a 
genealogy of risk highlight the politically contestable nature of these “facts” and 
“truths”, and are one way, therefore, of allowing for a critique of these practices, 
including a critique of derivatives trading. 
 
The intention of this thesis is not to discard the often-fruitful investigations 
provided by Marxist, neoliberal and neorealist accounts of the global political 
economy, however.  This is to incorporate these “stories” as part of a more 
comprehensive explanation and understanding of the processes involved.  Two 
recent studies of the international political economy of finance are worth dwelling 
on here to provide a clearer idea of what such a critical study might look like. 
 
Genealogical studies, or “critical histories” of this sort are still relatively new to 
the discipline of IPE.  Marieke de Goede, for example, has written a genealogy of 
finance that traces key contentions and shifts in the development of financial 
practices and their cultural contexts.  She argues that ‘understanding the politics 
of modern finance requires a rejection of the dichotomy between the ideal and 
the material, and starts with a consideration [of] how current discourses of 
financial rectitude and economic necessity have taken shape at the expense of 
                                                 
28 R. Deuchars, The International Political Economy of Risk: Rationalism, Calculation and Power (Ashgate, 2004) p. 1. 
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other possible financial representations.’29  This analysis includes investigating the 
gendered discourse of credit and credibility, the morality of speculation, the 
differences between gambling and finance, and the imagination of finance as a 
rational and scientific practice.  This work is but one example of the non-
rationalist research advocated by Palan and Amin, though it is different to the 
constructivist approaches they prefer to pursue.30
 
  Furthermore, Robert 
Deuchars’ study of the IPE of risk maps the rise of insurance technologies and 
financial rationalities made possible by the contingent developments of 
probabilistic technologies, by the advent of statistical knowledge, and by the 
employment of this technology and knowledge in early political economy.  Both 
de Goede and Deuchars, building on critical historical work from outside the 
discipline of IPE (and well beyond the discipline of IR), provide a launch pad 
from which a critical history of derivatives might be told.  
Discourse analysis, like that provided by de Goede and Deuchars, is a meta-meta 
critique.  This means that it is a critique that situates itself outside the realm of 
meta-narrative of rationalism, showing how the reliance on objectivist rationalism 
limits understanding of social practices in general, and of financial practices in 
particular.  By illustrating the important contribution these accounts offer, is not 
to say that this is the “whole story”, as it were.  But it does offer an important 
limitation to what are otherwise purported to be uncontested “expert”, and 
apolitical, opinions in highly important politico-economic processes and 
institutions.  Also, if we are to provide not just problem solving theories, but 
critical theories, as Cox discusses it31
                                                 
29 M. D. Goede, "Beyond Economism in International Political Economy," Review of International Political 
Economy 29 (2003): p. 81. 
, we need to account for change – how this 
30 A. Amin and R. Palan, "Towards a Non-Rationalist International Political Economy," Ibid.8, no. 4 (2001). 
31 R. W. Cox, "Critical Political Economy," in International Political Economy, ed. Bjorn Hettne (Halifax: 
Fernwood Books Ltd, 1995). 
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particular set of social practices has come into being, and how it is likely to 
change in the future – let alone how it might be possibly to change it, depending 
on one’s perspective and aims.  
 
These critical histories of finance and IPE follow Foucault in their analysis of 
power/knowledge contests.32
 
  They contest the agenda-setting affect power as 
knowledge has on contemporary social practices.  The implications of the 
consequent social constructivist approach is to question the legitimacy of the 
expertise that is proffered by those specialists that focus narrowly on particular 
sets of practices without showing an understanding of the context of their subject 
– the complex, social relations they are part of but not separate from.  With 
regard to derivatives trading as risk management, one needs to question the role 
of the “expert”, therefore, and how much control experts have over global 
finance. 
Following the above analysis, one key argument of this thesis is that there is an 
“illusion of control” over the financial market generally, and over the OTC 
derivatives market in particular.  Whilst it is obvious that there are various 
political stances apropos the need to (not) regulate derivatives trading, this essay 
investigates the question of control from a slightly different angle: do those who 
suppose to understand, predict, explain and control financial “risk” really know 
how to do so at the systemic level?  In other words, are the financial “risks” of 
derivatives trading understood well enough to enable us to regulate them (in 
reformist or extreme liberal form) properly, such that the systemic threats they 
pose to the international financial system are kept under control?  Reasons for 
this “illusion of control” include the ideological nature of the supposedly value-
                                                 
32 See M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, et al. 
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980). 
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neutral tools of modern risk management.  Any claims to objectivity in this regard 
are in very real danger of fostering misunderstanding of the nature and 
consequence of using models and modern risk technologies such as those 
employed in OTC derivatives trading. 
 
How will this thesis address the question of regulating OTC derivatives trading? 
This thesis takes as its starting point the critical assessment of the liberal 
understanding of what is “market risk”.  In doing so it explores the liberal 
definition of what constitutes a market, and how “risks” to this market might be 
understood.  This leads to the question of how “market failure” is understood 
and when market intervention is justified according to (neo-) liberal logic.  This 
critical overview of market risk provides the context to how we are to understand 
trade in OTC financial derivatives. 
 
The second chapter explores financial derivatives trading as an example of risk 
management.  The chapter briefly provides a critical history of derivatives trading 
as risk management.  This provides, in turn, context to the practice of 
contemporary OTC derivatives trading and, in doing so, briefly examines the 
assumptions that underpin the key mathematical models used for predicting OTC 
derivatives contracts.  By outlining the literature on derivatives trading in general, 
and OTC derivatives in particular, an understanding of how these tools are used 
is developed.  This leads to the question as to whether the practice of OTC 
derivatives trading is adequately understood within liberal “market risk” models. 
 
A case study of the giant American energy corporation Enron, and its use of 
OTC derivatives trading, provides evidence of how market risk can be 
(mis)understood, and how regulatory mechanisms of the state do not provide the 
kind of safe-guards required to prevent “risk” spreading from such a corporation 
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to the rest of the international financial system.  What is particularly interesting 
about this case is the way the fallout from the Enron bankruptcy has, like many 
bankruptcies involving OTC derivatives trading, been a focus for studies of 
fraudulent accounting and improvements of transparency.  However, the basic 
assumptions underpinning the use of financial derivatives, and the ability to use 
them “safely”, are left relatively unquestioned by most commentators.  This case 
study illustrates the distance between liberal accounts of theory and practice. 
 
If OTC derivatives are a source of “systemic risk”, then regulation is a key 
concern for liberals and other politico-economic ideologies.  This makes the case 
for regulation more convincing than many liberal commentators might think it is.  
The fourth chapter accounts for how the notion of regulation, as raised by the 
question of risk, is understood and developed according to various theories of 
international political economy.  Examining the notion of governance in the 
international financial sector points to the crucial question of structure versus 
agency in the OTC derivatives market, thereby placing talk of financial regulation 
in a philosophical, as well as political, framework. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
FRAMING UNCERTAINTY?  UNDERSTANDING MARKET RISK 
Introduction 
The introductory chapter outlined the problem of systemic risk that trade in OTC 
derivatives trading poses, and assessed various analytic languages employed by 
theorists of IPE to assess such risks.  It established that IPE needs to be 
understood in terms of a more critical approach than that offered by the 
“problem solving” theory of rationalist approaches such as neo-liberalism, and 
that post-structuralism offers one such useful approach.  This chapter elaborates 
on and explores the nature of financial market practices and the logic of 
regulatory policy options in this context.  The first section outlines what kind of 
market the financial market is, how it is supposed to function and what it is 
meant to do, based on the assumptions made by those who support the logic of 
it.  The second section outlines what constitutes a “risk” to this market, and 
therefore, how “market failure” is assessed.  The third section focuses on how the 
question of “market intervention” is framed as a result of this particular 
understanding of “risk” to market structure. 
What kind of market is this? 
A market is generally defined as a place in which trade is conducted, or that set of 
social interactions regarding the exchange of goods and services.33
                                                 
33 OED, ([cited 21 October 2004]); available from http://www.oed.com. 
  History and 
geography illustrate the variety of the different types of markets that humans have 
constructed through their desires to meet needs and wants of material goods.  
Importantly, though, the global political economy is increasingly a capitalist one.  
23 
While some argue the importance of recognising “varieties of capitalism”34
 
, for 
the sake of clarity it is easy to see central tenets of capitalism as a way of 
organising economy and society in general. 
First and foremost, the capitalist system is one that relies on the concept of 
“capital”.  Although originally associated with land and personal property, capital 
is essentially anything that is said to be owned, saleable and transferable (usually 
by an individual, but also including groups).  While sounding obvious (to Western 
ears in particular) today, these qualities are not natural givens – especially to 
something so central to the survival and livelihood of societies as land – and the 
institutionalised prominence of these particular values in society is historically 
unique.  This is, of course, a central and large subject to note (after all, Marx 
devoted three entire volumes to the subject), and much could be said about the 
notion of capital that cannot be covered here.  What we do need to note, 
however, is that the fact that this is a capitalist system means that it is one that 
privileges the role of capital and the conceptual and practical basis from which its 
exchange has been able to take a central part of modernist social practices.   
 
Second, the development of the notion of capital is historically and intricately tied 
up with the notion of individual freedom to own, buy and sell it.  Liberalism, in 
other words, provides the social and “moral” basis that underpins the logic in 
which capital should be used in society.  It is believed that by privileging the role 
of the individual, their self-interested pursuit of material gain will likely lead to a 
                                                 
34 See P. A. Hall and D. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), J. R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer, eds., Contemporary 
Capitalism: The Embededdness of Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), P. L. Kitschell, G. 
Marks, and J. D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).  Referred to here are primarily the distinctions between Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs).  Though, some have noted problems with this 
distinction. See M. Blyth, "Same as it Never Was: Temporality and Typology in Varieties of Capitalism," 
Comparative European Politics, no. 1 (2003). 
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more efficient and “progressive” economic system overall.35
 
  “Freedom”, in this 
regard, is assessed by the “right” for individuals to own property or other forms 
of capital, and to sell them to whomever they choose for whatever price is agreed 
under rational contract; to be able to sell one’s labour for a wage; and to be able 
to enter/exit the market with relative ease. 
Adam Smith outlined what he, and many liberals following him, consider to be 
the “basic laws” of the market:  
They tell us that the outcome of a certain kind of behavior [sic] in a certain social 
framework will bring about perfectly definite and foreseeable results.  
Specifically they show us how the drive of individual self-interest in an 
environment of similarly motivated individuals will result in competition and 
they further demonstrate how competition will result in the provision of those 
goods that society wants, in the quantities that society desires, and at the prices 
society is prepared to pay.36
 
 
The assumption that humans are essentially calculating is paramount here, and 
core to all liberal accounts of human behaviour and decision making.  Clear, too, 
is the importance of ‘individuated individuals, promoting their personal economic 
advantage, and this being “naturally” and “necessarily” the best for everyone 
else.’37  Not only did Smith make this central to his thesis, but some two hundred 
years later Fredrick von Hayek espoused the normative value of such an account, 
as well as its descriptive accuracy.38
                                                 
35 A strong moral component also exists here, as the contribution an individual makes to society has become 
increasingly linked to their success in economic terms.  This is in contrast to previous Western social 
norms informed by Christian values that denounced the accumulation of wealth and also linked hierarchy 
and esteem with “God-given” social divisions. 
  The twentieth century neo-classical 
36 R. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers, Revised 7th 
Edition ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2000; reprint, 1999) p. 55. 
37 R. Pettman, World Politics: Rationalism and Beyond (New York: Palgrave, 2001) p. 109. 
38 F. A. Hayek, Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge and Keegan, 1944). 
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economist Milton Friedman also made this assumption – of human beings as 
essentially calculating – the key to his analysis of the market.39
 
  The implications 
of such an assumption is that the market will work most efficiently, where there is 
little interference from government, or from “outside” forces. 
It is the self-interested individual that drives economic growth through 
entrepreneurial risk-taking ventures.  Moreover, and key to liberal theory, the self-
interest of these relative few provides the basis for economic expansion that 
grows the collective pie for all.  Ideally, then, the economic realm should be 
separate from the political realm, allowing for the “natural” laws of the market to 
play out (as nature intended). Both moderate and extreme liberals, therefore, ‘valorize 
competition, self-realization and self-maximization, not least because of the way these 
can be used to promote divisions of labor, both locally and worldwide, with all the 
productive benefits that then accrue’40
 
. 
Market efficiency is measured primarily in terms of the increase of production 
that provides for the consumption that is essential to such a materialist society.  
Moreover, the market is deemed efficient, according to liberals, if there is as little 
state interference as possible, and the level of production is increasing from year 
to year – i.e. that there is material progress.  How this productive wealth is 
distributed is not of such a concern for liberals (extreme market liberals in 
particular) though there must be provision for those workers who receive least 
for their labour or else productivity may be adversely affected.  This is, of course, 
the point Marxists dwell on the most, emphasising the fact that a class bias is 
evident in the capitalist market system, due to the division of labour that 
                                                 
39 M. Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1953). 
40 Pettman, World Politics: Rationalism and Beyond p. 109. 
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privileges those who own the means of production (and in this case more 
specifically, finance capital) over those who sell their labour for a wage. 
 
A key question, in regard to the structure and nature of this market, is “how” this 
particular type of market came about. 41
 
  Scholars differ in their 
accounts of this, depending on their assumptions about human nature and 
nurture.  For liberals, the evolution of capitalism is a natural outcome of the fact 
that all people are essentially calculating.  How else, they argue, can we explain the 
resilience of capitalist expansion in spite of so many (economic and political)  
obstacles and oppositions to it?  There are, of course, large disagreements within 
this liberal stance, from those who proffer different interpretations of human 
nature, to those who believe material or ideational factors conditions our 
interpretations and behaviour.  A key point to make, however, is that these are 
repeated human practices, not reified structures that have their own agency.  They 
are an aggregate of human behaviour over time and space, and change to this 
behaviour must be aware of the many individual components that make up its 
parts.   
In order to understand a phenomenally large aggregate of known behaviour, 
scholars of IPE have divided their analysis of the global political economy into 
three main sets of practices: trade, production, and finance.  It is finance that we 
are primarily interested in here.  While the nature of trade and production are 
open to interpretation, these are very concrete practices.  Finance, on the other 
hand, whilst obviously “real” in the sense that it affects the lives of people every 
day, is made up of far more speculative/imaginary/precipitous stuff.  So, what is 
finance, and how is the financial world structured? 
                                                 
41 Polanyi is interesting in his discussion of ‘market society’ here.  K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New 
York and Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc, 1994). 
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Exchange of capital is limited if it is not easily transferable or if there is not an 
agreed medium upon which exchange can be based.  This is where the role of 
money and finance come in.  After all, a financial market is a market for the 
exchange of credit and capital.  Money is the means by which debit and credit is 
measured; it is a means of exchange between large numbers of people who do 
not necessarily know each other, and would otherwise not trust each other in 
trade without the formulated and regulated symbol money represents.42  This fiat43 
money is reliant on the beliefs of the individual and state actors that collectively 
determine how this symbolic value should best be calculated.  This is no mean 
feat given the wide variety of transactions and the large number of people whose 
varying preferences must be taken into account. 
 
Finance is concerned with how this meta-realm of wealth determination is to be 
understood.  Practitioners of financial transactions (for example, the exchange 
between those with debt and those with credit) seek one key thing: money, or 
wealth.  In order to get this money a financial actor needs to understand not so 
much what something is worth to them, but rather what something is worth to 
other people.  Furthermore, they may need to understand what it is worth to a 
group of people who live locally, and share similar preferences, needs and wants, 
or they may need to understand what something is worth to people on the other 
side of the world.  This is increasingly the case in markets that are no longer 
limited locally, but transcend local, national, regional and international 
boundaries.  Furthermore, they may need to understand what that something is 
                                                 
42 For a further formal definition and discussion of money, see J. Tobin, "Money," in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Money and Finance, ed. Peter Newmann, Murray Milgrage, and John Eatwell (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1992).  
43 Fiat money is symbol money backed with the authority of the state to give credence and help trust in public 
usage.  See Ibid. 
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worth now or they may need to understand what it is worth at some point in the 
future.   
 
To work out the “value” of something in the future requires a complicated set of 
assumptions about human behaviour, and mathematical and statistical models 
able to approximate what the future value is likely to be.  As with all liberal 
market practices, one has to get at least one other person to agree that yours is a 
reasonable approximation of what the value is likely to be at the designated time 
in the future. There are now thousands of people who use these techniques to 
predict and place financial “bets” on the future value of assets and securities. 
 
This system relies on the mediated “trust” offered in the form of credit being 
reciprocated and maintained.  Therefore, the logic of this system is one that is 
automatically biased against those who are not actively productive or “credit-
worthy”.  This system is now global, and credit risk analysis is a huge market in its 
own right.  Credit risk is one of the main types of risk in derivatives trading, as a 
default on a contract can leave the other contracted party out of pocket, not to 
mention the follow-on effects of other parties involved.  
 
The growing importance of finance in an increasingly globalised and liberalised 
economy  has gained the attention of more scholars to the study of global 
finance.  To some extent, the question of prioritising the study of these three 
components of the IPE is still an important question.  Many believe finance to be 
the area of the global economy that flows from trade and production, merely 
providing the liquidity to “grease the wheels” of production, as it were.  
Meanwhile, others argue that capitalist expansion and economic structure would 
not only not be possible without financial capital, but that it is the very driving 
force behind the historical development of capitalism in general.  This is an 
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interesting debate to dwell on, as it is ultimately a philosophical question as to 
how to best understand historical change in political economy: is it driven by the 
material forces of production, as Marxists assert? Or is it driven more by the 
creation of ideas, by the “invention” of the notion of credit and financial 
instruments, that has allowed calculating individuals (constructed or otherwise) to 
pursue capitalist expansion?   
 
According to V. Spike Peterson ‘Global finance broadly defined is a reference to 
cross-border capital flows of credit (bonds, loans), money (currency exchange), 
and investment (equities, capital transfers).’44  Further, Strange explores financial 
exchange by noting that it 
comprises not just the structures of the political economy through which credit 
is created but also the monetary system or systems which determine the relative 
values of the different moneys in which credit is denominated; in the first the 
power to create credit is shared by governments and banks (and much will 
depend therefore on the political and regulatory relation of the one to the other).  
In the second, the exchange rates between the different moneys, or currencies, 
are determined by the policies of governments and by markets (and again much 
will depend on how much freedom governments allow markets).  A financial 
structure, therefore, can be defined as the sum of all the arrangements governing 
the availability of credit plus all the factors determining the terms on which 
currencies are exchanged for another.45 
 
In a discussion of the financial market practice it is important to recognise and 
address the large scale and velocity of international capital flows.  Importantly, 
                                                 
44 Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive, and Virtual Economies 
p. 114.  
45 Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy p. 90. 
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though, as Peterson notes, ‘analyses must acknowledge and address the nature of 
these transactions and their effects on more conventional forms of exchange.’46 
 
Though the role of finance has traditionally been given less importance than the 
other dimensions of the international political economy, such as trade and 
production, the importance of finance cannot really be underestimated in the 
context of current market structures.  As Peterson notes, ‘the dictates of 
interdependent global financial markets increasingly shape the policy options and 
hence politics of territorially bounded nation-states.’47 
 
For Susan Strange the key point to be taken from a discussion of finance is the 
notion of credit.48  To Strange, this is an important point to note as,  
The power to create credit implies the power to allow or to deny other people 
the possibility of spending today and paying back tomorrow, the power to let 
them exercise purchasing power and thus influence markets for production, and 
also the power to manage or mismanage the currency in which credit is 
denominated, thus affecting rates of exchange with credit denominated in other 
currencies.49 
 
Marxists disagree with Strange’s attributing so much importance to credit in an 
understanding of the financial sphere of the international political economy.  For 
Marxists, finance, including credit, is to be understood as a logical extension of 
the accumulation of capital that is central to a “capitalist” system.  Stephen Gill 
and David Law outline the key differences between a Marxist and a liberal 
                                                 
46 Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive, and Virtual Economies 
p. 113. 
47 Ibid. p. 130. 
48 Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy. 
49 Ibid. p. 90. 
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approach to the importance of finance, by noting how ‘Neoclassical economists 
often treat the three factors of production as similar, that is as productive inputs 
which are equally necessary.’ Marxists, on the other hand, ‘whist acknowledging 
the productive character of capital equipment, also focuses on capital as a social 
relation.  In this relationship, capital exploits labour by extracting surplus.  Thus 
in the Marxist formulation, capital and labour are social and political concepts, as 
well as purely technical, economic ones.’50 
 
Marxists are not the only ones to argue that money is a political concept in this 
regard.51  The critical financial economist, Elton McGoun, stakes out at least five 
different functions of money in a modern financial economy, with particular 
emphasis being given to the way in which money has provided the basis from 
which the “financial” economy has become separated from the “real” economy.  
The study of money is the examination of a range of complex interconnected 
social processes, and certainly not all (if any) can be understood in scientifically 
economic terms alone.  It is not surprising, therefore, that Peterson argues that 
contrary to liberal accounts “money is not neutral”.  Furthermore, ‘The key issue 
here is how fundamentally value is determined not by any inherent measure of 
labor inputs or material needs but by reference to positioning within a system of 
signs/values.’5253  That the role of subjective opinions in financial matters is 
                                                 
50 Gill and Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems, and Policies p. 83. 
51 J. Kirshner, "Money is Politics," Review of International Political Economy 10, no. 4 (2003). 
52 Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive, and Virtual Economies 
p. 117. 
53 This is also a point that the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard has made clear in his discussions of the 
symbol value of money and commodities in general.  See: J. Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, trans. Mark 
Poster (St. Loius: Telos Press, 1975), J. Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. 
Charles Levin (St Louis: Telos Press, 1981). 
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important is hardly new, notes Peterson, but ‘(beyond a narrow construction of 
“rationality”) it has rarely been a focal point of liberal and/or positivist analyses.’54 
 
It helps to place these theoretical accounts of international finance in some 
context.  As Gilpin notes, ‘International finance is the one area to which the term 
“economic globalization” clearly applies.’55  The market type of financial structure 
is now pervasive.  Woods identifies three unique aspects to the process termed 
“globalization”: internationalization, the technological revolution, and 
liberalization.56  Internationalization ‘describes the increase in economic 
transactions across boarders which has been taking place since the turn of the 
century but some argue has undergone a quantitative leap in recent debates.’57 
 
The final point about liberalization is a particularly important one to dwell on for 
a discussion of the financial market place.  The previous thirty years have seen a 
dramatic shift from a world financial system largely informed by Keynesian liberal 
economic policy.  The post-World War II period operated under a system of 
state-regulated currency markets, strict regulation of capital flows, and largely 
restricted (in the form of protectionist) policies on international trade.  While the 
Bretton Woods agreement instigated a more moderate liberal approach to the 
international financial system, influenced mainly by Keynes, there were important 
trade-offs with the US that allowed for significant US control of international 
monetary policy.  Since Nixon’s devaluing of the US dollar in 1973 and the 
subsequent ideological moves (first) from many Western and then (later) from 
                                                 
54 Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive, and Virtual Economies 
p. 115. 
55 R. Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2001) p. 261. 
56 Woods, "International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization," p. 290. 
57 Ibid. 
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many developing countries has seen a rise in less regulated financial markets 
under the “informed” logic of neo-liberalism.  As O’Brien and Williams point 
out, ‘In the global credit system, the creation and supply of credit has moved 
from being the responsibility of public authorities (governments) to being 
provided by corporations.’58 
 
The dramatic increase in OTC derivatives trading can be seen as a reflection of 
the expansion of financial capital markets.  Financial markets are no longer 
confined to a relatively small number of Western-based financial centres.  They 
are now an integral part of economic processes in most parts of the world.  OTC 
trading in derivatives is, by definition, trade that happens outside of formally 
regulated exchanges, however. 
Developments in communications technologies as well as the ideological shifts by 
many governments towards the “freeing of capital” have resulted in increasingly 
interconnected markets.  A consequence of this interconnectedness is that the 
prices of commodities, interest rates and currencies are affected by the financial 
exchanges of people all over the world.  
 
While financial markets have become more homogenous and widespread, 
however, the development of contemporary global financial practices reflects 
their Western origins.  There has also been a marked concentration of wealth and 
trade among a small number of large actors (mostly large American and 
European based banks and firms).59 
 
                                                 
58 R. O'Brien and M. Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004) p. 224. 
59 J. A. Scholte, "Global Trade and Finance," in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis and Steve 
Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 528-532. 
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This system of abstract self-reference is exacerbated by a process of financial  
money is a form of social power that has assumed new forms with the 
expansion, integration, and transformation of financial markets.  The flow of 
capital in these markets increasingly determines the fate of national economies 
and hence their domestic populations.  At the same time, these flows of 
symbolic money are increasingly delinked from the “real” (material, productive) 
economy of goods and services.   
 
Langley points out that the distinction between the financial/real markets is a 
false dichotomy.  This observation is not new, as he notes that ‘scholars writing in 
the Marxist tradition have characterised global finance as a period in which the 
speculative accumulation of capital through the creation, buying and selling of 
credit instruments has become a structural feature of capitalism.’60 
 
“Financialisation” is also viewed to be an important component of the modern 
global political economy by Langley.  This term represents the notion that 
speculative practices of finance are growing and are becoming more interwoven 
with the everyday lives of people in their more “basic” market practices.  
Importantly, he notes that this is process of finance ‘feeding on itself rather than 
nourishing the real economy’.61  This is not just an “academic” point of difference 
with liberals over their understanding of financial and economic processes, but a 
fundamental difference of opinion of how we understand the likelihood of 
financial market failure in some lesser or greater form. For,  
‘Under conditions of financialisation, promises to pay carry with them the 
assumption that socio-economic relations are commodified.  However, as 
Polanyi’s inspirational analysis serves to remind us, the adjustment of social 
                                                 
60 P. Langley, "The Everyday Life of Global Finance," IPEG Papers in Global Political Economy (2003): p. 15.  
Also, see P. Langley, World Financial Orders: An Historical International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 
2002). 
61 Langley, "The Everyday Life of Global Finance," p. 16. 
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relations in the face of pressures for commodification encounters significant 
social, political and embedded institutional forces.  It follows that a contradiction 
present between credit practices that are subject or respond to speculative 
motivations on the one hand, and the tensions generated by credit obligations 
that assume the commodification of “real” socio-economic relations on the 
other. Panics, asset price volatility and ultimately crises break out as the 
assumptions of commodification cannot be consistently met.62 
 
In other words, the tenuous creation of trust between a large number of people 
requires continued faith and re-evaluation that the value placed in the symbol of 
money/finance is justified.  As money becomes more “abstract”, its relationship 
to the everyday transactions in the “real” economy must be reinforced by a 
complex set of socio-economic norms to ensure that these symbol-values 
maintain worth and legitimacy. Global finance ‘thus systematically affects the 
“real” economy but the value of financial instruments is determined by making 
money from money, not by growth or productivity in the economy of goods and 
services.  The result is the “virtual” economy, where the vast preponderance of 
value in the global economy – which affects the entire system – is determined less 
by “objective” than subjective factors.’63 
 
Tied up with these processes is securitisation, that is, ‘the “bundling”, pricing, and 
secondary trading of formerly illiquid claims and obligations arising from the 
creation of credit,’ has focused on displacing the ‘risks arising from outstanding 
claims and obligations including exchange rate, interest rate and credit risks.  
Global finance has witnessed a rapid increase in practices that seek the 
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displacement of such risks by hedging price fluctuations, utilising an ever-
widening range of derivatives instruments.’64 
 
In an account of the IPE it is always important to ask the question: for whom?  
So, for whom is finance capital for, and for whom is financial globalisation for?  
We have already established that this is essentially a liberal market order, albeit 
one that works within the confines of statist politico-strategic world.  These 
practices are essentially for those people who implement the neo-liberal model.  
According to neo-liberal theory, they ultimately benefit everyone as they increase 
the whole pie, and even if those who are “responsible” for the increase enjoy 
most of this increase, everybody’s material gain can be measured in “real” terms.  
Marxists are traditionally the biggest critics of this process, as they argue that 
those who are responsible for productive processes, the labourers who add value 
to capital in the process of production, are exploited by those who own the 
means of production.  Peterson also illustrates the link between production and 
finance in stating that ‘the wildfire growth in financial markets is structurally 
linked to the shift from manufacturing jobs and Fordist practices to less secure 
work associated with flexibilization.  These labor market dynamics entail not only 
differently valorized activities but differently gendered, raced, and classed 
identities.’65 
 
However, ‘Although internationalization of finance has become an important 
feature of the global economy, the international financial system continues to be 
largely nationally based and consists of closely interconnected, discrete national 
financial systems.’66  Therefore, the state is certainly not rendered meaningless in 
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analyses of IPE, though states vary greatly in terms of the benefits they receive 
from such processes.  It is no coincidence that those who enjoy the benefits of 
extreme monetary wealth are predominantly from Western countries, are 
individually motivated, and privilege reason as an end in itself.  They are also 
likely to be “risk-taking” types.  Therefore, this type of market ‘necessarily 
increases inequality’67, both within and between states, as bankers and financial 
speculators make money out of money.   
 
This is a significant shift in the privileging of “risk-taking” as central to the 
“progress” of economic growth worldwide.  It is important to note that this 
system of credit creation necessarily increases economic instability.  As strange 
notes ‘The market system may be more efficient and flexible and better adapted 
to change and innovation but it is also apt to be more unstable.  It suffers 
bankruptcies and bank failures.  It experiences financial crises both national and 
international.’ 68  
 
The idea of security is important here.  The economic security of the individual is 
paramount for the liberal, and is privileged above those mercantilist accounts of 
economic security for the state.  Of course, this is the ideal for extreme liberals, 
and a few countries have moved significantly towards this model, but most 
countries are not yet willing to give up key regulatory controls over economic and 
financial practices.  In many regards, and despite the overtly neo-liberal economic 
policies they put forward for other countries, the USA adopts many policy 
options that reflect a strong mercantilist bias, thereby recognising the term 
security in economic as well as strategic terms.  However, within the US, neo-
liberal market logic has certainly informed most policy moves towards the 
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38 
deregulation of many industries (such as the energy market, as will be discussed 
further in relation to the case of Enron in chapter three) so that they will be open 
to the competition and “efficiency” of the open market. 
 
Financial instruments like derivatives have flourished in this liberal market 
economy.  The reason so many people partake in such transactions is simple and 
obvious, given the liberal logic of the market.  If one can predict the future price 
of an asset, then one can eliminate price variables from calculations of future 
costs, thereby allowing for a greater degree of financial planning.  In other words, 
tools of “risk management”, such as derivatives, are a way of providing some 
degree of certainty in what is an otherwise uncertain economic world.  ‘It is also 
worth noting that derivatives operate not just at the level of world capitalism in a 
Braudellian sense – amongst the large transnational corporations, institutional 
investors and hedge funds that operate within and raise funds in the wholesale 
financial markets – they also have begun [to] pervade the economics of everyday 
life, although most people are unaware of this.’69  This is a point that Langley 
focuses on in his discussion of the everyday life of finance.  He, as well as 
Peterson, calls this process the disintermediation of finance.70   
 
As Pauly notes, ‘the more open economies become to inward and outward capital 
flows, the more difficult it is for governments to maintain stable exchange rates 
and monetary policies fully sensitive to national priorities.’71  In this regard, as the 
financial market has become more globally integrated, and capital controls have 
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become less state-controlled, state policies have become more aligned with the 
interests of capital.  According to liberal logic, this will serve everyone, albeit 
unevenly.  It will reward those who own the capital and put it to the most 
“productive” use.   
 
Risk, in this regard, is both privatised and individualised, as it takes a 
predominantly market form (such as the provision of private health care 
arrangements, private security guards, etc.).  People are encouraged to think of 
themselves as prudential individuals that need to be responsible for their financial 
future.  But contradictorily, risk is increasingly generalised (e.g. environmental 
risks or market risks, such as a fall in the stock market undermining the life-
savings of people), as the role of the state, the formal democratic representation 
of the interests of its people, plays a more ambiguous and marginalised role.  
Legal responsibility become salient here, as insurance markets flourish, but 
ultimately, however, it is still the state, and its citizens, who pay for many social, 
environmental and economic costs that are not borne by the private sector. 
 
How is the notion of “risk” understood? 
That the notion of “risk” should be so central to this type of financial market, 
then, raises the question of how this “risk” is qualified and understood, and how 
this approach matches up with the nature of the financial market itself.  A risk to 
the market is considered to be a threat to the continued system of credit creation 
and monetary exchange.  These threats are considered in lesser or greater 
quantitative terms, and are categorised accordingly.  For instance, financial 
analysts divide the risks associated with derivatives trading into as many as nine 
categories: credit risk (the risk that one of the parties will default on payment 
according to the contract), market risk (that the market itself will alter 
considerably affecting key variables such as exchange rates), legal risks and 
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systemic risk (the threat of one large financial collapse leading to the demise of 
the entire financial system to a greater or lesser extent). 
 
It is important to point out that risk is a way of framing uncertainty.  The 
uncertainty of human behaviour is the subject with which every person in 
business is concerned, whether they are aware of it or not.  To know the future of 
the market is to provide a framework for decision-making in the present.  Thus, 
“risk” is a concern for the future expressed in the present. The possibilities of the 
future are best measured, according to most liberal economics texts, as the 
probability of an event occurring, multiplied by the cost of that event occurring 
(risk = probability x cost).  This is a key point: risk, for liberal economists, is 
always uncertainty made into a calculable concept, and it is always defined in 
terms of a probabilistic calculus (i.e. quantified). 
 
In liberal economic terms, that is, risk is understood in calculable terms, and is 
seen as distinct from the “uncertainty”.  Frank Knight, now recognised as a key 
contributor to the economic understanding of risk in business practices, outlines 
this distinction in his 1931 book, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit: 
… uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar 
notion of Risk, from which it has never properly been separated.  The term 
“risk,” as loosely used in everyday speech and in economic discussion, really 
covers two things which, functionally at least, in their causal relations to the 
phenomena of economic organization, are categorically different.  …  The 
essential fact is that “risk” means in some cases a quantity susceptible of 
measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character; 
and there are far-reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the 
phenomena depending on which of the two is really present and operating.72 
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The notion of “risk” is a contested one in contemporary debates across the social 
sciences.  For starters, this account is one that neatly bounds uncertainty in 
rationalist terms, outlining a clear dichotomy between a future that is not known 
and a future that is known (at least in probabilistic terms).73  How risk is 
understood depends on a variety of theoretical and ideological stances that all 
offer different epistemological interpretations.74  Underpinning the dominant 
liberal models of risk analysis is a belief that the scientific methods used to study 
the “natural” world are apt for study of the social world.  In liberal studies of 
economic behaviour, for instance, methodological individualism, and the 
assumption that people are essentially calculating, has informed “objective” 
explanations of the social world “out there”.  This is an epistemologically realist 
position, in that “risk” is objectified to be understood as a thing that exists.  This 
relies on the assumption that the social world “out there” can be known as 
separate and uninfluenced from the language we use to describe it.  Risk, 
therefore, is a real danger, and the best way to explain it is to use scientific 
methods that, though might not be perfect, do tend towards a “true” account of 
the “facts”. 
 
It is this epistemologically realist position, contextualised within liberal accounts 
of human nature, that provides the basis for scientific risk management analyses 
that are prevalent in, and underpin modern financial practices, such as derivatives 
trading.  For instance, the Black-Scholes options pricing model and credit risk 
analyses play central roles in OTC derivatives markets. 
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Importantly, in a liberalised market economy risk, these scientific risk analyses 
provide a more central role that they would in a more regulated financial market.  
Self-regulation means that these mathematical models and calculative predictive 
tools provide risk “experts” with the basis for decision-making in private firms.  
 
Derivatives are a good example of how these tools for scientific risk management 
are used.  Derivatives are a double-edged sword in that they are tools for the 
management of risk, and in many cases, do provide a greater degree of market 
(and, within the liberal project, even some degree of social) certainty – the task of 
any form of insurance.  However, the highly leveraged and abstracted value of 
derivatives, coupled with their speculative use, increases volatility, and therefore 
raises the issue of the need for regulatory mechanisms to bring greater certainty 
to the market.  This argument is analysed in more depth in chapter two, however, 
the point is an important one for the following discussion of market intervention.  
Concern for market failure is the key to a liberal understanding of the market.  
The role of derivatives is an important part of this understanding. 
 
The implications of a financial system that places so much emphasis on reference 
to itself (as with the use of financial derivatives), render the complex 
mathematical and “scientific” methods of risk analysis problematic.  If scientific 
methods of risk analysis attempt to look at fundamentals (such as the real 
economy of trade and exchange in goods and services) and derive the value of 
derivatives using these methods, then the models that are produced may not have 
factored in key “variables” that are central to these fundamentals.  The 
“constants” may also be problematic. 
 
As Galbraith succinctly puts it, ‘[a]ll crises have involved debt that, in one way or 
another, has become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means 
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of payment.’75  The interesting point about derivatives is that they increase the 
separation between the instruments of debt and the underlying assets and 
securities that are the basis for the value of debt.  Too many people trying to cash 
in at the same time leads to a financial crash.  States try to isolate this so that it 
does not spread to the rest of the market.  The threat of a financial crisis 
spreading is understood as “systemic risk”, and is the subject of much debate, 
particularly with regard to the use of OTC derivatives. 
 
Predicting financial crises at this level, especially in a globalising financial market, 
is not small ask.  We therefore have to ask how effective tools of scientific risk 
management are at predicting financial crises.  This is a question that both states 
and private market actors are extremely interested in.  It is also a very contentious 
issue that goes beyond the analysis provided here.  However, what needs to be 
made clear is that scientific risk analysis provides a rationalist basis for liberal 
policy makers to argue for greater financial freedom from state controls. 
 
When is “market intervention” justified according to liberal logic?  
If, in liberal parlance, market success is assessed by continued material growth, 
and measured according to increasing profitability, then market failure is said to 
have occurred if ‘a market that is left to itself does not allocate resources 
efficiently.’76  Leaving for the moment the contentions of economic “efficiency”, 
we can say that this is very much the ideal from the liberal perspective.  
Therefore, according to liberalist accounts, the financial market should experience 
little (if any) “intervention” from the state.  The market is understood to work 
most efficiently, that is, when individuals are allowed to exchange credit and debt, 
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creating a competitive environment, and keeping prices in line with what they are 
really “worth”, that is, their “natural value”.  This is perceived to be a “natural” 
process – one that should not be interfered with – due to the “fact” that 
individuals act as essentially rational, self-maximising decision-makers.  From this 
premise follows the practice of privileging individuals and their opportunities to 
make the most of their marketeering skills.  The market is seen as the “fairest” 
assessment of what an individual is worth.   
 
Sticking to the principles of the “free market”, however, is only worthwhile if you 
have a market to keep free.  Despite the resistance of liberals to having 
government intervention in trade and finance, they have their “price”.  As Balaam 
and Veseth point out, the nature and significance of finance is compelling from a 
liberal perspective: 
John Maynard Keynes once noted that if he owed the bank a hundred pounds 
sterling and couldn’t pay it, he was in trouble.  But if he owed a hundred 
thousand pounds and couldn’t pay, the bank was in trouble.  The character of a 
financial relationship thus depends on the quantities involved as well as the 
connections it creates.77 
 
This relates to the question of “cui bono?”, or “for whom”.  As Marxists have been 
keen to point out in class terms, the modern state is so closely aligned with the 
interests of capital (such as laws that protect property and the maintenance of the 
capitalist market economy) that neo-liberals can take great risks knowing that the 
system will be propped up by the state.  Though systemic risk might be a very real 
threat, and though “self-management” of this risk is preferred, state intervention 
is relied on when market failure does occur.  This raises the issue of that liberal 
scholars call “moral hazard”. 
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‘The trouble is that banks are not like other businesses.  They enjoy a privilege 
not conferred on metal-bashers or greengrocers or anyone else – the right to 
take deposits.  Those deposits are in effect underwritten by the taxpayer, who 
has to cough up if a bank fails.  Should banking regulators be allowing deposit-
takers to indulge in such huge and complex bets? I think not.’78 
 
Market intervention where finance capital is concerned (including trade in OTC 
derivatives) operates according to the above logic.  Because finance capital is seen 
to lubricate the flow of the market more generally, and because it is too complex 
for states to control anyway, it is best to have as little intervention as possible.  
This has become the norm for much of the Western world, and increasingly for 
much of the developed world.  Gill points out that the question of market 
intervention is also important due to the increasing permeation of financial 
innovation in every day life, and ‘how expectations concerning the future are 
shaped in part by the new financial structures (for instance, the likelihood of an 
adequate pension on retirement).   
 
The irony of this free market system, where individual responsibility and reward 
is supposed to be a cornerstone principle, Gill notes that while the principle of 
self-regulation as better for all, ‘many liberal economists point out that derivatives 
traders may be taking imprudent risks in anticipation of a government bail out, 
for example where the central bank acts as lender-of-last-resort: a type of 
socialization of risk.  As Cerny notes, the problem of market intervention is made 
more problematic by two key issues. First, that of the ‘tug-of-war between 
national governments and transnationalized markets for control of the 
international financial system’ which makes any consistent regulatory regime 
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difficult.  And second, that of the ‘relationship between the financial economy 
and the real economy[, which] is a long way from being resolved.’79 
 
Furthermore, the fact that this is an increasingly globalised financial economy, 
that has is becoming further intertwined, gives credence to Cerny’s point that ‘any 
future national control would be limited, indirect and constrained to conform to 
the imperatives of the transnational financial markets.’80 
 
Liberals follow the division of labour to a particular extreme.  They believe that 
those who work most with financial markets are likely to be those who best 
understand these processes.  That people are assumed to be “rational” indicates 
that these “experts” have a strong basis upon which to lay their claim to 
expertise.  Market intervention is therefore informed by expert discourse, which, 
as was discussed earlier, has its roots in methodological individualism and 
objectivist rationalism.   
 
This can be seen in relatively recent policy moves in the US with the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act, which has greatly reduced the level of rigorous state 
regulation.  This indicated both a preference for free market principles, and an 
implicit belief in rationalist methods of risk management.  Therefore, the 
relationship between ideological policy options and supposedly value-free 
technical analysis is intricately tied up. 
 
Conclusion 
The above discussion makes clear how liberals understand the nature of the 
financial market.  This market is increasingly “going global” and neo-liberal logic 
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predominantly informs these market-making practices, as well as the risk 
management tools and techniques within this structure.  It is within this abstract 
financial economy that derivatives now feature.  The logic of extreme liberal 
market practices dictates that the experts of international finance need to be given 
free reign to move financial practices toward increasingly “efficient” processes.  
The role of government, according to liberals, should therefore be limited, and 
any form of regulation should be ideally left to the “experts” to get it right.  The 
question is: do the “experts” have a critical enough understanding of financial 
market practices to allow them to predict key challenges, such as systemic risk 
due to derivatives trading? 
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C h a p t e r  2  
HOW ARE WE TO UNDERSTAND DERIVATIVES? 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the way in which the financial market operates, 
who it works for, what is considered a “risk” to this market, how this “risk” is 
understood, and, therefore, when the question of market intervention is 
subsequently raised.  This chapter outlines the role of OTC derivatives within this 
market structure, showing how they operate both as tools for risk management as 
well as increasing risk in the international financial system.  First, this chapter 
defines derivatives, outlining different types of derivatives markets, thereby 
illustrating the specific role of OTC derivatives.  Secondly, the chapter employs a 
“critical history” of finance in general, and of derivatives more specifically, to 
clarify the ways in which derivative financial instruments have been used, and 
have come to be given such prevalence in the modern political economy.  In 
doing so it illustrates how the way they have been considered depends on the 
politico-economic, politico-social and politico-cultural contexts they have been 
used within.  Moreover, the analysis shows how the modern notion of financial 
derivatives have been “made thinkable”, tied up with the construction of the 
modernist notion of “risk”.  Third, this critical interpretation of the construction 
of derivatives leads in to a literature review of derivatives, raising questions over 
how best to understand these tools for risk management.  In doing so, the 
chapter examines the key assumptions of the mathematical models that underpin 
the faith that analysts and traders alike place in the use of these tools.  When 
these assumptions are matched with the speculative and compounding use of 
derivatives that is in practice today, serious doubts have to be raised as to the 
control neo-liberal “experts” can be said to have over systemic risks. 
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What are derivatives? 
Derivatives are defined as ‘financial instruments which derive their value from an 
underlying asset.’81  Derivatives can be essentially divided into two main groups: 
those that are forward-based and those that are option-based.82  Forward-based 
contracts give the right to buy a particular asset or security at a particular time in 
the future, thereby offering insurance against price (and general market) volatility.  
Options-based contracts give a person the right, but not the obligation, to buy or 
sell (named puts or calls, accordingly) an underlying asset or security at a 
particular time in the future.  The benefit of these latter contracts is that if one 
would have been better off without the contract in the first place there is no 
obligation to buy/sell the underlying asset or security at a price higher/lower than 
they can get on the market in “real time”.   
 
However, derivatives contracts do get more complicated than this, as derivative 
products are developed that have other derivatives, instead of an asset or other 
form of security, as the underlying basis for their abstract value.  Abstract is the 
key word here, as it is not uncommon to have options on futures, futures on 
options and a wide variety of self-reflective variations.  The names are as creative 
as the financial innovations they represent, with a host of swaps, collars, 
swaptions, etc., making up a vocabulary that most finance practitioners must 
struggle to keep up with.83 
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82 Ibid. 
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The basis (asset or security) of derivatives contracts can, in theory, be anything.  
Traditionally, derivatives have been based on commodities, like wheat and grain 
in nineteenth-century US markets, or rice in eighteenth-century Japan.  Today, 
interest rates and currencies, among other securities such as bonds, make up a far 
greater proportion of derivatives traded globally.84  The importance of financial 
securities in the contemporary international political economy, as well as their 
increased volatility since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods era, is obviously 
one reason for the growth in derivatives contracts in securities rather than 
commodities markets.  However, the fact that less than 1%85 of annual futures 
trading ends up being consummated in possession-taking raises an important 
concern over the purpose of these instruments to most people who use them.  
Derivatives differ to most assets or securities in that they do not generally involve 
ownership or title.  Therefore, it is possible to gain exposure to a relatively large 
investment/amount while paying a fraction of this cost (at least in the short 
term).  This means that most derivatives contracts are highly leveraged.  
Therefore, the ability to “hedge” against the future of the market not only 
provides an opportunity for insurance, but it also allows one the opportunity to 
gain substantial amounts for relatively little investment.  This leverage provides 
the basis for a great deal of speculation – or, in other words, a  form of gambling, 
the reason for the title of Susan Strange’s book Casino Capitalism.86 
 
An important point to note is that while many derivatives contracts can be 
considered speculative activity, the underlying commodity or asset has to be 
owned by someone at some point.  Therefore, while prices do appear to be 
driven by people who are ultimately very removed from daily lives of many of the 
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people who use and distribute the assets and securities under consideration, there 
is still a link to the “real” economy, as it were. 
 
There are essentially two kinds of derivatives markets – exchange traded and 
over-the-counter.  Exchange traded markets are formally regulated markets that 
are set up for the exchange of specific kinds of derivative-based financial 
contracts on certain assets and securities.  Key exchanges to consider are the 
Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE), established in 1973, and the London 
International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE). 
 
OTC derivatives trading, by contrast, are those derivatives contracts that are 
exchanged outside of the regulated confines of regulated exchanges.  OTC 
derivatives are where the real innovation in financial instruments begins, as a 
derivatives contract can essentially be constructed on any underlying asset, 
security or derivative that two or more parties agree upon.  Arguably, the only 
important factor that really matters is whether the two parties think that the 
contract will be worth something to them.  
 
Exchange-traded derivatives are relatively well regulated, as only registered 
financial corporations can trade on these exchanges, and most of the derivatives 
contracts are pre-set.  OTC markets, on the other hand, are relatively unregulated.  
Not only are there a large number (potentially unlimited) of tailor-made 
derivatives contracts that can be traded, but any company, municipality, 
government, or bank can trade in them.  For instance, look at the cases of 
Orange County and Enron.  Therefore, not only is the variety of derivatives 
contracts greater on the OTC market, but this number of financial players 
increases as well.  The result is that the overall volume in trade has increased 
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markedly with an increase in financial trade and proliferation of neo-liberal 
market policies as part of economic globalisation. 
 
There are a number of types of risks to consider in a discussion of derivatives 
trading, though it is systemic risk that amplifies across all politico-economic 
positions.  Market risk dangers arise from the changes in market conditions 
generally – these are the risks that are associated with general changes in market 
prices, and therefore encompass a large number of factors.  Credit risk (or 
“counter-party” risk) is the risk of one of the parties involved in a derivatives 
contract defaulting.  This risk is a particularly important one to consider for OTC 
derivatives trading as due to the lack of regulation, any two parties can agree to 
enter into a contract together.  
 
Derivatives increase systemic risk in the financial system due to the complexity of 
derivatives themselves and the sheer volume of transactions.  As noted in the 
introduction, there are roughly $2 trillion dollars worth of trade in OTC 
derivatives per day.  This is a number too large to comprehend with any real 
meaning, especially when compared to the kind of income of most of the people 
in the world.  The question of volume is one of “flow”, however, and the fact 
that almost all contracts end up being worthless – i.e. derivatives trading is 
essentially a zero-sum game. 
 
A lot of companies use derivatives for good reasons.  These instruments provide 
a greater degree of certainty, in terms of currency markets, commodities, and the 
like.  Many banks, companies and even public municipalities use derivatives 
contracts in less prudent ways, however.  O’Brien and Williams concisely outline 
the key problematic with these tools of risk management: 
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Used wisely, derivatives can insure business and individuals from the risks of 
falling or rising prices.  However, they are also used to make money by betting 
on the value of a product at some time in the future.  If they are correct about 
the price movement, they can sell at a profit.  If they are incorrect, they suffer a 
financial loss.  Since these products can be bought on margin, large sums of 
money can be pledged without having the ability to pay for it at the time of 
purchase.  This kind of system encourages investors to take risk for potentially 
large pay-offs.87 
 
OTC derivatives markets operate according to self-regulatory principles, 
informed by expert risk managers.  To understand the risk OTC derivatives pose 
at a systemic level therefore requires an examination of the expert understanding 
of derivatives, underpinned by objectivist rationalist risk models.  However, 
before discussing the nature of derivatives trading in terms of different analytic 
languages and critical accounts, it is important to gain some historical 
understanding of how these instruments of risk management have been 
developed and used in order to provide context to the power/knowledge 
relations that are played out in the IPE of OTC derivatives trading. 
 
A short history of derivatives and financial crises 
Of particular interest to international political economy is the way in which 
derivatives, a form of risk management, have historically come to be so. For, in 
the Nietzschean/Foucaultian88 tradition of critical histories, we find that 
derivatives have been extant for some time, but their use and development has 
been restricted and largely determined by particular cultural frameworks of 
thought. This interpretation of history as contending and non-linear goes against 
                                                 
87 O'Brien and Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics pp. 236-237. 
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the liberal logic of capitalism or the Marxist analysis of historical materialism, for 
example, where there are grand narratives based on particular assumptions about 
human nature and nurture.  Rather, the history of derivatives, and of finance, 
capitalism, and modernity more generally, can be viewed as a complex 
combination of cultural interactions that are non-deterministic and non-
evolutionary in nature.  The consequences of interpreting history in this fashion is 
that contemporary practices that we may view as given and beyond critique are 
opened for debate and thus re-politicised in the context of their ideological 
nature.  Put more simply, these are social systems that are made, and remade by 
repeated human practices.  In order to understand, let alone alter, these practices, 
one needs to appreciate the many strands that make up the whole of human 
behaviour. 
 
Mitchell Dean makes these points salient with regard to the notion of “risk”, as it 
has come to be understood in the modernist context: 
What is important about risk is not risk itself, but the forms of knowledge that 
make it thinkable from statistics, sociology and epidemiology to management 
and accounting, the techniques that discover it from the calculus of probabilities 
to the interview, the social technologies that seek to govern it from risk 
screening, case management and social insurance to situational crime prevention, 
and the political rationalities and programmes that deploy it, from those that 
dreamt of the welfare state to those that image an advanced liberal society of 
prudential individuals and communities.89  
 
The history of derivatives is often presented as one that is limited to modern 
developments in the American and British financial settings, and indeed it is only 
                                                                                                                             
88 See M. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Foucault Reader: A Critical Introduction to Foucault's 
Thought, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1991), F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas 
Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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in the last thirty years that derivatives trading have come to play a major role in a 
truly international financial environment. However, evidence can be found of basic 
types of derivatives, such as futures and forwards contracts, as far back as the 
past 4000 years.  Perhaps the earliest record of derivatives trading dates back to 
the records of the Code of Hammurrabbi, where evidence can be found that futures 
trading were regulated. As one commentator has noted, ‘[a] grain merchant was 
permitted to borrow a fixed amount of gold to pay for a barley crop before the 
next harvest. If barley fell in price, the merchant came out ahead when he repaid 
the loan – and the Code stipulated that if this futures contract was duly signed and 
witnessed, neither party could renege.’90 One of the interesting points to note 
regarding the Code is that it offers insight into aspects of capitalism that we usually 
view as particular to our modern times. This example of futures trading shows 
“advanced” understandings of money, credit, interest, and insurance; all of which 
encompass elements of modern day financial capitalism. 
  
The ancient Babylonians were not the only ones to recognise the value of futures 
contracts as a way to mitigate the uncertainties of unforeseeable natural events. 
Periclean Athens, Augustan Rome, Abbasid Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire at 
the death of Suleiman, Mughal India at the death of Akbar, Flemish traders in the 
12th century, Medici Florence, Elizabethan England, as well as the United 
Provinces at the Peace of Münster, used varying types of derivatives financial 
instruments as a way of mitigating the effects an uncertain world brings to any 
economy.91  Most types of derivatives were simple: futures contracts provided a 
                                                                                                                             
89 Dean, "Risk, Calculable and Incalculable," pp. 132-133. 
90 J. W. Michaels, "Did the Babylonians have an SEC?," Forbes, August 15 1994. 
91 Include all references to pre-modern financial derivatives.  J. Buchan, Frozen Desire: The Meaning of Money 
(New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1997), J. Day, Money and Finance in the Age of Merchant Capitalism (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1999), R. Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance: A Study of the 
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particular mechanism for ensuring the changeability of the weather would not 
necessitate the same uncertainty for the economy.  What I find interesting in 
these early examples of derivative financial instruments is not so much their 
“proof” that mankind has always been moving towards capitalism, say.  In this 
regard, there is no origin for financial capitalism in the development of these 
financial instruments.  Rather, that the use of these instruments has been so 
restrained, not only shows the importance of moral or religious reasons, but it 
also shows the importance of a complete political and cultural setting that would 
allow these instruments to be used so widely and such for speculative purpose.  
An examination of their use in various early to late modern capitalism further 
highlights this point. 
 
These pre-modern examples of financial instruments are interesting when 
compared with contemporary practices of derivatives trading in that they appear 
to be limited both in terms of the types of instruments that were available and 
their complexity. There are a number of features associated with the emergence 
of financial capitalism that create favourable conditions for financial instruments 
to be developed and used. For example, money, credit, debt and interest, are all 
key developments that could not have been developed in pre-modern times in the 
way we think of them today, due to cultural restrictions that would not allow their 
use on a moral basis.  Ehrenberg offers us an insight into the cultural mindset of 
the medieval European and their Christian attitudes towards money:  
Penucia pecuniam non parere potest. Money is essentially unproductive. Anyone, 
therefore, who demands fruits from it, sins not only against positive 
commandments of divine and secular law, but also against the nature of things. 
A man profoundly learned in this commercial law of the Middle Ages formulates 
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in these words the principle which for many centuries ruled the undisputed in 
theory and even attempted to bring practice under its sway. 
This ecclesiastical view of money capital had its origin in the leading idea of 
Christianity directed against the materialism of antiquity – the idea that earthly 
things were valuable only in so far as they served as the preparation of life to 
come. It was based on a moral precept from the Bible, and a saying of Aristotle, 
which apparently was only the statement of an ideal, but which interpreted as a 
principle, appeared to deny the productivity of money. 
 
It is interesting to note at this early stage one of the key features of financial 
capitalism: the ability of financial capital to not only be a measure of trade and 
exchange in the real economy, but also its ability to affect, and to some extent 
control, the workings of those fundamentals upon which the financial 
(abstracted) economy relies.   
 
As noted above, derivatives are not new.  They have been used in a variety of 
politico-cultural settings.  Second, there have been key periods where derivative 
financial instruments, and the speculation surrounding them, has resulted in 
debate over money, gambling and speculation.  This history is rife with moral and 
political assumptions about the role of such instruments in society.92  
Furthermore, it illustrates the rise of certain ontological, epistemological and 
methodological views that now constitute a largely uncontested account of what 
is real, true and factual.  This not only results in shortcomings in how “risk” is 
understood and managed in finance, but also helps re-open debate over issues 
that are viewed as being beyond political critique. 
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This point about re-politicising risk is an important one, but not the only one.  
The other key point is the social construction of “risk”, and therefore the socially 
contingent nature of risk management practices today.  It is also very useful for 
illustrating how tools for risk management have helped create risk; and how this 
is politically framed. 
 
The origins of the financial innovations that allowed financial capitalism to 
eventuate are to be found in the 16th century and the rise of Antwerp as a key city 
of commerce. The development of the foreign bill of exchange became one of 
the key financial innovations that allowed a multinational and multilingual 
marketplace to emerge.93 
Money, credit and capital are, quite literally, systems of writing.  This goes for 
the earliest forms of credit and book-keeping money as well as for late-modern 
definitions of capital.  For instance, Mary Poovey argues that early-modern 
book-keeping, which forms the basis of current accountancy practices, was a 
rule-governed kind of writing which “tended to create what it purported to 
describe”.94 
 
‘Put simply, financial instruments such as options and forward contracts emerged 
in conjunction with the longer time horizons brought about by voyages of 
discovery and colonial conquest in early-modern Europe.’95 
 
For instance, numerical arguments never used to be as convincing as they are 
today.  It was only the development of arguments based on numerical calculation, 
such as those made by Descartes, that made possible developments in modern 
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forms of insurance in general, and in financial risk management in particular.  Ian 
Hacking has documented the emergence of probability in early modern Europe, 
for instance, as a significant epistemological challenge to alternative forms of 
argumentation.  What was considered probable, prior to the end of the sixteenth 
century, had more to do with an oratory argument given by a person associated 
with authority.  Rhetoric and social standing or authority, in this regard, was as, if 
not more, important than the validity of the argument.  This wording is 
misleading though – the argument was valid if it was attached with authority.96  
Numerical probability as we know it, was treated with suspicion and caution.  
Even as mathematics came into its own as the new “proof” of grand design and 
God Himself, probability appeared to undermine the certainty sought by the likes 
of Descartes.  It was only with the onset of collections of statistical data of state 
populations in the early nineteenth century that natural laws appeared to be so 
unevenly distributed, undermining the (until then) solid and God-given concept 
of human nature, and probability and its “normal” distribution became a useful 
tool for taming this uneasy new world of chance. 
 
It is dangerous to make this history over-simplistic however.  While probability 
did not come into its own in social analysis until the nineteenth century, growing 
insurance markets throughout Europe began to make use of the probabilistic 
calculus to ensure a safe return on chancy mercantile ventures.97  This contributed 
to the growing links between what was considered a lesser form of mathematics 
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and a growing mercantile class that was struggling for greater economic freedom 
and social recognition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.98 
 
By the mid-nineteenth century, financial trading had started to become backed 
more closely by “scientific” evidence, making great use of developments 
probabilistic calculus and the collation of statistical knowledge.  Interestingly, De 
Goede notes that debates over the legitimacy of derivatives in post-civil war USA 
still centred around moral issues, with many farmers arguing that futures trading 
was creating too much price volatility, which was seen to be as a result of 
speculation, understood to be gambling by most.  As with earlier examples of 
speculative use of derivatives ‘US farmers argued that professional speculators 
were trading in “fictitious commodities” or “wind wheat”.’99 
 
For de Goede, there was a conscious recognition by financial experts at the end 
of the nineteenth century that ‘the dissociating their practices from unproductive 
gambling was vital for the political legitimacy of their profession.’100  Thus, the 
emphasis on “scientific” analysis of stock prices took hold in financial circles, 
especially in early twentieth century. ‘It was a way for speculators to assert their 
productiveness and intelligence in the face of growing opposition to their trades 
as fraudulent and gambling.  Dow, Jevons and Bachelier [all key financial 
commentators and players] located the cause of price fluctuations as external to 
the financial system, in contrast to the Dutch shareholders who admitted that 
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price movements depended on speculators’ hopes and fears.’ 101  In particular, de 
Goede notes the era leading up to and following the financial crises of 1929 as a 
period of normalising practices of scientific finance.  Contrasted with the legal 
debates surrounding lotteries in London and bucketshops in the US, the legal 
debates in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century were set within the 
confines of the SEC that was established in the aftermath of the 1929 stock 
market crash. The SEC was established to regulate the workings of the financial 
world that would operate according to these more rationalist principles and 
guidelines.  Importantly, the trend towards faith in objectivist rationalist methods 
of analysing economic and financial processes reflects wider moves to quantify 
study of social relations.  
 
More recent history of derivatives – the age of derivatives? 
The past 20-30 years has been a period of history characterised financial 
liberalisation and endorsements of attitudes, policies and rationalities that make 
this possible. While a title such as “the age of derivatives” is certainly an 
exaggeration and overstatement, it may also have some merit to it.  Derivatives 
trading has become the most expansive area of financial trade in the past 10-20 
years with astronomical growth in volume tantamount to the close relationship 
these instruments have come to share with financial liberalism.  While I would 
not for a moment suggest that derivatives are the only, or most important, 
development in the recent era, they nevertheless characterise the ambitions and 
logic of that time-frame: the expansion of capital and liberal markets through the 
tools of risk management and its accompanying speculation.  
 
The financial revolutions evaluated in the previous section of this chapter 
explored how finance became normalised under the guise of mathematised risk 
                                                 
101 Ibid.: p. 156. 
62 
analysis and quantified evaluations of economic behaviours. The positivist turn in 
the social sciences generally, and finance in particular, fuelled the intellectual 
environment for quantified models of risk analysis and management.  
 
In 1971 Fischer Black and Merton Scholes published their foundational article on 
the Journal of Political Economy on the Options Pricing Model.  This model was 
soon recognised as a significant revolution in financial modelling, and the 
Fischer-Black formula outlined a model for arbitrage – risk-less trading – in 
options trading. 
 
This is often where the history of derivatives trading begins its narrative. 
Derivatives trading is born with the volatile markets, financial deregulation and 
new technologies that provided the environment for their inception.  We have 
seen, however, that derivatives trading, in its basic forms at least, is not a new 
concept, and has had a tumultuous history of contestation tied up with its 
association with speculation and gambling. In a sense, though, this history was 
forgotten102 by many who were keen to see the usefulness of a tool for risk 
management in increasingly uncertain economic times. Derivatives would 
become an important way of insuring against the wiles of the international 
financial marketplace.  
  
De Goede’s analysis of the normalisation of financial discourse in the 1930’s 
becomes especially relevant here in determining the discourse of financial 
possibilities available.  Derivatives were no longer an issue for moral, social or 
political concern; they were an issue for technical refinement and practical 
progress.  The debate surrounding the use of derivatives is not one to include 
these lay concerns, but should be carried out by economists and financial experts 
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who could work out their role in the new financial era.  Therefore, as the financial 
market has become increasingly liberalised and globalised, neo-liberal arguments 
to purport this trend have also relied on expert discourse to reject various 
political (understood to be separate from economic) perspectives. 
 
Furthermore, as the international financial market has become more liberalised 
there has been more reason for various actors to make use of the insurance 
qualities of derivative financial instruments.  For instance, Exchange rate 
instability creates systemic risk in the financial system, and derivatives operate as a 
way of transferring risk from one party to another (importantly, they do not 
eliminate risk).  Another motivator, as discussed above, is also the increased 
opportunity for profit with the “creation” of new markets that trade in derivatives 
offer.  This has become particularly prominent with the technical developments 
of complex derivative products and the ability to put them to use in deregulated 
markets.  In particular, currency market turbulence, exchange rate instability, 
inflation accused price instability and large swings in key financial prices are worth 
noting here.  Pryke and Allen argue that these are new “types” of uncertainty that 
have to be dealt with.  These authors argue that ‘the nature of uncertainty and risk 
stemming from this disorder is qualitatively different’ to those previously 
“experienced” in modern market economies.  Thus, a culture of risk taking 
appears to have grown since the 1970s.103  More colourfully, Michael Lewis, 
author of Liar’s Poker, calls this unbridled form of capitalism, “the age of 
leverage”.104 
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Theorising derivatives: how are they to be understood? 
The practice of derivatives trading in particular, as well as the wider politico-
economic, politico-social and politico-cultural settings within which this practice 
takes place, have also received increasing attention from social theorists in recent 
years.  Much of this literature examines aspects of the question of “risk”, as 
mentioned above, and is therefore included throughout this section. 
 
First, the liberal account of derivatives is relatively simple, as was outlined in the 
previous section.  Derivatives are a form of risk management that can be used to 
insure against the uncertainty of the market.  In this respect, proper use of 
derivatives offer the very best in scientific risk management, and this is essential if 
one wishes to make the most of a globalising and competitive financial market 
place.  Liberals recognise that derivatives are not always used properly, however, 
this is not the fault of derivatives themselves, or the risk management models 
they are based on, but rather a question of greater transparency in the process to 
ensure “market mechanisms” correct any abnormalities before they become too 
great. 
 
Therefore, for the liberal, it makes sense to focus on the details of derivatives risk 
analysis, being sure to understand the various credit, operational, legal, etc., risks 
that exist.105  Therefore, much of the “hype” surrounding the various and 
sensational financial collapses involving derivatives appear very misplaced, from a 
neo-liberal perspective. ‘In conditions of a perfect market derivatives are unable 
to affect the price of underlying assets (such as exchange or interest rates) and all 
they can do is to allocate risk between different players in the market.  As they 
spread that risk more widely, derivatives should provide a wider systemic 
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stability.’106  Many neo-liberals do now acknowledge “market failures” as a result 
of asymmetric information as well as, in some cases, path dependence, among 
other things, however, the assumption that human behaviour can be understood 
in essentially calculating terms informs this interpretation of events as well.  
 
Categorising risk in this way allows the analyser to focus on particular 
probabilistic calculations that help clarify where the areas of greatest concern 
come from. However, these classifications are themselves reified concepts.  For 
instance, accounting knowledge and “facts” are not unproblematic, as Mary 
Poovey has examined.  Her analysis of double-entry bookkeeping highlights the 
way in which “facts” and “truths” are constructed, partly in order to give 
ontological security to a particular type of knowledge that provides explanation, 
prediction and control.107 
 
Contrasting this epistemologically realist line, Pryke and Allen draw from a 
sociological interpretation of money to interpret derivatives as a new form of 
money.  According to the sociologist of money, Gorge Simmel, the significance 
of money is in its bringing about a change in the pace of life.108  This is the focus 
for Pryke and Allen: derivatives represent a qualitative shift in the nature of 
money.  This qualitative change has come about due to the increased speed of 
their trade and the pervasiveness of these instruments.  ‘As new forms of money 
– new means of exchanging temporally and spatially specific risks – derivatives 
involve the reimagination of seemingly all events as calculable and manageable.’109 
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Stephen Green also notes the way in which the “culture of finance” encourages 
risk taking in modern financial practices.110  His analysis of the culture of finance 
concurs with that of other critical analysts of finance in his recognition of the 
political nature of such practices.  ‘Financial markets have produced risk as an 
attitude to the future not only to cope with threats but to entrench their systems 
of wealth creation and epistemological authority.  Risk management as a system 
of interlocking technological, institutional, and social forms of action has become 
entrenched in global markets because of its basic ability to combine the modern 
ambition for certainty about the future and capitalism’s willingness to bring 
imagined futures into the realm of the market.’111 
 
Stephen Green argues that ‘the literature on risk, through its emphasis on 
scientific techniques, often glosses the negative qualities of the risk system.  These 
include three main problems; the ways it allows, even encourages, risk-taking; the 
concentration within the financial system of vulnerability; and the inability of risk 
models to comprehend the “social” nature of the market.’112   
 
Green illustrates the importance of critically assessing the notion of “risk” using 
financial market practices such as OTC derivatives trading.  This preludes the 
discussion of the critical literature that notes the genealogical rise of “risk” as it 
has come to be thought of the way it is today.  For this investigation, I draw on 
the work of Deuchars and de Goede in particular, as they document the politico-
economic, politico-strategic, politico-social and politico-cultural settings that have 
made “risk” thinkable. 
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Of key interest with relation to derivatives contracts, is the question of how we 
create value in this type of market.  As McGoun notes, ‘[o]ne of the primary 
concerns of finance is the value of financial assets.  This sounds simple enough, 
but since financial assets are a form of money, finance is in effect concerned with 
the value of money.’113 
 
This “value” of derivatives relies on the construction of monetary processes 
based on liberal assumptions.  For “universal values” to apply, everyone must 
share the same values.  If everyone does have the same values, such as those 
required for global market prices, this is not so problematic, and the question 
becomes one of transparency of process, accountability and open access (all 
central aspects to liberal economics and its assumptions).  But, if this liberal 
assumption of humans as calculating is not universal (both through time and 
space), the regulation tends towards the construction of normalising disciplinary 
techniques so that everyone does take on these “values” as their own, by 
privileging a liberal democratic part-truth as a whole truth. 
 
The questions of who has control and who takes the risks require “re-
politicisation,” however. Risk and control are concepts that are tied up with the 
relationship between the knowledge that informs those with the “expertise” and 
the ideological power that is already culturally embedded in those knowledge 
structures. 
 
Financial derivatives are essentially a form of ‘risk’ management, and so the very 
notion of ‘risk’ needs to be looked at very closely. As theorists from sociology 
and anthropology have explored exhaustively, risk has a cultural history particular 
to Western modernity that can by no means claim universal applicability. The 
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emergence of financial capitalism is tied up with the history of ‘risk’, as early 
modern forms of mercantile and other insurance relied upon developments in 
probabilistic calculus, as well as later applications of statistical knowledge. 
 
These developments in knowledge, as well as having contributed to the modern 
notion of ‘risk’, are deeply political. The employment of increasingly calculative 
practices as a legitimisation (and “professionalisation”) of financial analysis has 
also helped contribute to the thin, but important, line of difference between 
gambling and finance. Derivatives are used not only as a form of insurance, but 
also as a form of speculation and extreme profit-making ventures. When an 
analysis of this type is explored it becomes clear how embedded many of these 
“technical” concepts are within the liberal ideological project of capitalistic 
principles. 
 
Derivatives are a specific financial instruments that act as a form of insurance 
against the uncertainty of the market, and they offer opportunities to financially 
benefit from “getting it right when others get it wrong”.  For liberals, then, they 
exploit “inefficiencies” in the market, and help prices reach equilibrium – i.e. they 
help keep the market “freer and fairer”.  The Black-Scholes options-pricing 
model offers a framework of utilising financial derivatives in a more systematic 
and calculative way.  Based on certain key assumptions114, the Black-Scholes 
model claims to eliminate the possibility of risk from an options-based derivative 
contract.  Although modifications to it have been made since the original 1973115 
version, it remains the foundation for most computer models used in derivatives 
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trading today.  It exudes the epistemological confidence many academics and 
practitioners alike have in the ability to quantifiably bound uncertainty. 
 
There are two key assumptions implicit in the Black-Scholes model.  They  relate 
to the analogy between stock prices and particles in Brownian motion (the theory 
of particle physics upon which the model is based).  The first assumption is that 
of randomness, or stochastic process.  The second assumption is that of 
equilibrium in the market.  The world’s market must operate according to the 
rules of neo-liberal economic theory, that is, including ‘market efficiency’, open 
information, and “free and fair” competition.  These neo-liberal economic 
assumptions are not surprising.  However, what is important to note is that the 
claim to scientific objectivity (and therefore greater expert legitimacy) that is 
implicit in the quantified Black-Scholes model is intricately reliant on these 
assumptions, and they are (essentially) normative views of human behaviour.  
These values are not made explicit. 
 
De Goede notes that ‘Black and Scholes reasoned that option prices could be 
calculated if one know the current stock price and the average volatility of a 
particular stock.’ 116  This relies on the view that there are ‘objectively true and 
fair’ prices for stock options, and therefore relies on a deterministic view of 
financial behaviour.  Underpinning this analysis is the view that humans are 
essentially rational and that markets can be understood according to the orthodox 
economics view of equilibrium.  However, rather ‘than as a contestable 
construction of the fair price of financial instruments, the Black-Scholes formula 
was heralded as the scientific discovery of financial truth.’117 
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Donald MacKenzie provides an interesting analysis of the Black-Scholes options-
pricing formula.  He argues that even if the assumptions that the model is based 
on are not true, so many financial firms use the model that many actors begin to 
act as if the assumptions were true.118  He explains that ‘s-terms are constituted by 
loops of self-reference119 and self-[validation].’120  These s-terms are viewed as 
similar to Hacking’s analysis of “human kinds”.  Further, ‘[t]he self-validating 
inference loop that constitutes money has become so taken for granted as to be 
invisible.  The patterns of belief that constitute money become evident only when 
those beliefs become precarious in times of social collapse or hyperinflation.’121  
If the trend-spotters create trends themselves (i.e. if there are enough of them) 
this is called positive feedback.  If the opposite occurs, this is called negative 
feedback, proving the efficient market hypothesis.  MacKenzie argues that ‘it 
seems plausible that the predominant pattern is negative feedback – that the 
search for pricing anomalies to disappear, in other words, that the activities of 
those who believe the market not to be efficient help make it efficient.’122  
Importantly, then, ‘finance theory has played an important role in its assumptions 
becoming more realistic.’123 
 
However, as Phillip Bougen’s analysis of “catastrophe risk” in reinsurance 
markets suggests, there is not so much a recognition of the limits to 
understanding risk in the financial sector, as there is a view of risk as a malleable 
concept which utilises statistical knowledge and probabilistic calculus to make 
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certain (neo-liberal) political rationalities dominant in the market.124  Insurance 
markets are only getting bigger, not smaller.  The desire to insure against human-
made catastrophe is as great as it has ever been.  Whether they will be successful 
is the question those who partake in risk debates want to see answered.  Pat 
O’Malley points out the danger in the tempting view that: ‘Modernity would have 
proven itself capable of governing these new risks, of taming yet another area of 
chance.  [Or thinking that it] would demonstrate that modernization risks are 
governable by risk calculation and insurance.’125  Rather, argues O’Malley, it is 
more instructive to argue that this line of inquiry into the “successes” of 
insurance markets in “catastrophe risk” ‘is to chart the variety of ways in which 
catastrophe risks are already being governed in this new environment.’126  In this 
regard, O’Malley furthers claims to strengths in the governmentality school 
approach to questions of risk and government. 
 
In relation to the culture of finance in general, and of derivatives trading in 
particular, Elton McGoun’s analysis of hyperreal finance illustrates the extreme 
way in which finance has become decoupled from the ‘real’ economy, and has 
become a culture that privileges trading for the sake of trading.  This analysis of 
the culture of derivatives trading does not, however, discount the self-interested 
individual (person or firm) that strives for more money and is therefore driven by 
greed.  It does shift the focus away from this alone, however, placing the 
emphasis on a better understanding of what is being considered in the decision-
making process by financial analysts and investors. 
 
                                                 
124 P. D. Bougen, "Catastrophe Risk," Economy and Society 32, no. 2 (2003). 
125 P. O'Malley, "Governable Catastrophes: A Comment on Bougen," Ibid.: p. 276. 
126 Ibid. 
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The concept of the rational individual decision maker in financial analysis and 
trading is a prevalent one in orthodox economics.  This notion not only gives 
credence to the legitimacy of the “expert”, but also reinforces the assumptions 
that underpin the models used to analyse “risk”.  One has to ask, therefore, 
whether the actual practice of “risk management” matches the rational actor 
models used. 
 
Assumptions regarding individual human behaviour are sought to be made true 
through the disciplinary normalising practices of economic, social and cultural 
change.  This is where the question of governmentality comes in.  Interesting in 
this regard, is the analysis of the “black box of mathematics” that Maurer assesses 
in relation to the way derivatives markets are analysed.  To a large extent, it does 
not matter what the mathematical formulae and numerical calculations imply in 
mechanical terms, as the underlying construction of frameworks of knowing is 
“repressed, subjugated, forgotten, etc….” In other words, what these numbers 
actually mean is not considered important in their day-to-day usage by derivatives 
markets.  In doing this, Maurer argues, there is a repression of epistemological 
process, and of the moral arguments that are part of historical construction of 
“fact”.  He argues that ‘derivatives can take on the indexical power they do in 
critical and neo-liberal accounts only if their operational, mathematical technique 
is left in the black box, shut away, bracketed or repressed.’127  He does not place 
the same emphasis on the influence of the model that de Goede does, however.  
He also disregards the focus of the claim that traders in derivatives actually use 
derivatives  
They might not. Rather, I am claiming that, regardless of the 
mathematical technique’s use of efficacy, its being “left aside” allows it to 
                                                 
127 B. Maurer, "Repressed Futures: Financial Derivatives' Theological Unconscious," Ibid.31, no. 1 (2002): p. 
19. 
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maintain a very privileged status in any account of contemporary 
derivatives trading.  I am further arguing that its repression, exclusion, 
bracketing from analytical and neo-liberal scrutiny does a certain kind of 
work that allows derivatives to take on their putative stability as financial 
entities and also to take on the peculiar indexical power with which they 
have been invested, especially since the 1980s and 1990s as they have 
become more important to the world financial markets and more visible 
– the power to point towards big changes afoot, to the aspect, state or 
truth-value of other phenomena.128 
 
Maurer’s analysis of the Black-Scholes options-pricing model raises interesting 
issues concerning the power of the epistemological contestation over “fact” and 
“value”.  What is said to be known is therefore questionable.  Even complexity 
theory129, for all its attention to “details”, does not ever stop to question the 
historical construction of statistical knowledge and probabilistic calculations.  
This is one of the “dangers” to many objectivist rationalist analyses of human 
practices, in that the meaning of such accounts is left ambiguous due to the 
abstract gap between the dichotomised “theory” and “practice”. 
 
All of the above analysis also raises issue as to the political nature of supposedly 
value-neutral technical pursuits, such as accounting, auditing, the practice of 
statistics, sampling, and credit rating.  Understanding how these are political, and 
therefore prescriptive as well as descriptive, is important for a number of reasons.  
First, and foremost, from the perspective of the IPE scholar, is the recognition 
that technical pursuits such as those named above, make it possible to see how 
                                                 
128 Ibid.: pp. 19-20.  (Emphasis in original). 
129 P. Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems (London and New York: Routledge, 
1998). 
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different forms of politico-economic structure might be replaced by ones deemed 
less desirable.  From the perspective of Marxist, socialist, feminist, indigenous and 
other critical theories, this insight offers a powerful tool of critique to add to their 
agenda.  Secondly, the issue of the reliability of tools for risk management, that 
depends so much on all of the above-mentioned technical pursuits for its 
“objectivity” is seriously undermined.  Simply put, rationalist attempts to explain 
and predict financial (and other social) processes fail to factor in the social 
influence and affect on processes.  In other words, the social world is not “out 
there” with objective laws that can be discovered.  Rather, the theorist influences 
the outcome of their social analysis. 
 
How justified are financial “experts” in their claim to such a title? 
In a discussion of the “political” it is necessary to an understanding of the role of 
the “expert” in contemporary world affairs.  IR theorist, Jenny Edkins, provides a 
useful outline of the role post-structuralist analysis can provide in understanding 
the construction of expert discourse.  The key point to be taken from Edkins’ 
analysis is that technologisation emerges as a result of the mental division of 
labour, combined with the cultural move to give a great deal of legitimacy to the 
“expert”.130  Risk management becomes an issue for the expert of finance – it is a 
practice that is “depoliticized” (according to neo-liberal logic).  This marginalizes 
the voices of critics who, it is claimed, do not understand the issues.  Now, there 
are very good reasons for giving faith to the experts in a technocratic society, if 
one believes that technocratic structure to be necessary or desirable.  However, 
there is a very real danger at the same time of instrumental reason driving the 
logic of policy options, and critical consideration of political, social and moral 
ends outside of that logic being excluded.  The division of labour limits what is 
                                                 
130  
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considered relevant to the expert’s role, thereby rendering him or her deaf and 
blind to considerations important to in others in the same society. 
 
For instance, Jenny Edkins analysis of poststructuralism and IR theory provides 
an interesting lead into how to understand derivatives trading.  Derivatives can be 
see, in this regard, as an extension of politics as technologisation.  No longer are 
questions of finance seen as political in nature, although political implications are 
not entirely ignored.  But rather, the technologies of finance, such as derivatives 
trading, are a realm to be assessed by a collection of experts. Finance, financial 
capitalism, and the important assumptions that these processes rest upon, are not 
problematised as political.  This is problematic, as the “scientific” basis for the 
“objective” accounts provided by financial experts rely on a particular ontological 
view of the world “out there”.  Deuchars outlines a crucial point, in this regard: 
the specific way in which the notion of “risk” is bracketed out from 
“uncertainty”. 
Economists talk about decision making under conditions of uncertainty, 
meaning incomplete information about the future.  This makes the condition of 
uncertainty a neatly bounded problem, primarily concerned with expectations 
about the future, related to a possible range of decision choices.  For example, 
even complete uncertainty can be rationally bounded. For economists, complete 
uncertainty is taken to mean a situation whereby ‘all information about 
probabilities is absent’.  This is a very specific definition underlying which are 
two main assumptions and a third cognate assumption.  Firstly, the definition 
assumes that the condition of uncertainty is primarily if not wholly situated 
within the communicative frame for the purpose of making decisions.  Secondly, 
it rests on the assumption that decision making is premised on rational 
calculation, specifically calculation that can be quantified as opposed to being 
simply a matter of qualitatively weighing up the pros and cons of particular 
situations prior to a decision-choice.  Finally, the two main assumptions are 
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linked by a third assumption, which is that we are dealing with a hypothetical 
individual as the primary unit of analysis.131 
 
Interestingly, the aftermath of many financial crises such as LTCM and Enron 
has not been to critically assess the models relied upon, as the above analysis 
would suggest, but, rather there has been a call for greater complexity in the 
models.  This is in line with ‘the notion that radical uncertainty can be tamed by 
the increased use of advanced mathematics, non-linear modelling and so on.’132  
There is also an argument here that problems created by ‘technological advance 
itself can solve problems created by technological advance.’133  As noted in the 
previous section, complex mathematical models, such as the Black-Scholes 
options-pricing model, may provide greater predictability in the short term, 
however, the increasing complexity of OTC derivatives markets (largely spurred 
on by the development of these technological instruments) increases volatility and 
uncertainty.134  In this sense, and despite the complex formulae that proliferate 
more information about the market than ever before, ‘increased complexity can 
reach the point where the system can not be said to be known. In other words the 
system’s architecture no longer provides a complete picture.’135  
 
Given this analysis of derivatives trading, there might be considered to be an 
“illusion of control” over OTC derivatives trading.  As a system of self-regulation 
                                                 
131 Deuchars, The International Political Economy of Risk p. 109. 
132 Ibid. p. 176. 
133 Ibid.  This is a critique of instrumental rationality that goes back to the work of Horkheimer and Adorno 
and their analysis of the “dark side” of modernity.  In particular, see M. Horheimer, Critique of Instrumental 
Reason: Lectures and Essays Since the End of World War II (New York: The Seabury Press, 1947), M. 
Horkheimer and T. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972; reprint, 1972). 
134 Deuchars, The International Political Economy of Risk p. 176. 
135 Ibid. p. 177. 
77 
informed through expert discourse proliferates along with the phenomenal 
growth in OTC derivatives trading, control at the level of the international 
financial market is left questionable at best.  Despite Toulmin’s faith in rationalist 
ways of knowing, he provides an important consideration in light of the above 
discussion: 
The general belief of the expert economists that the “data” to be considered in 
such decisions can be purely “factual,” and so free from ethical and political 
assumptions, blinds them to the full range of factors they should take into 
account.  The crucial questions do not turn on ensuring the formal correctness 
and consistency of our calculations; they depend rather on collecting all the 
relevant social, historical, cultural, and even personal information about the 
people involved, and their actual needs.  In this respect, a traditional reliance 
on Euclidian and Newtonian models of theory continues to focus attention on 
“doing your sums right” and conceals the equally important task of making 
sure that you are “doing the right sums”: in other words, doing calculation that 
are directly relevant to the practical situation in question.136 
 
From my perspective, this requires not only a fundamental rethink of the 
assumptions made by liberal economists about human behaviour and time, but 
also a rethink of what factors actually matter in understanding market practices.  
Given that the global market is increasingly intertwined with a range of politico-
strategic, politico-economic and politico-social factors, it appears impossible to 
separate out exactly what is important to analysis and what is not all of the time, 
especially at such a macro level incorporating a wide variety of products and 
incredible volumes.  While increasingly complex mathematic models do provide a 
greater degree of accuracy, within a particular framework, they might not be able 
to account for multiple-contingencies that are very much a factor in such a 
globally integrated and complex financial market. 
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Conclusion 
In summary, questioning the role of derivatives in these world affairs requires an 
understanding of both the scale and scope of their trade, as well as a critical 
account of how this scale and scope has been made possible.  The above 
assessment has illustrated that derivatives are not only political in terms of who 
they affect, but also in the way technologies of risk management are ideologically 
loaded.  Not only does this open up space for political critique, but it also 
illustrates severe limitations to neo-liberal accounts of how risk management is to 
be understood. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
THE CASE OF ENRON 
Introduction 
Financial history is fraught with stories of boom and bust.137  Recent financial 
history is no different, and exhibits its own fair share of companies and 
institutions that have found their demise in the use of financial instruments such 
as derivatives.  Notable examples include the spectacular collapse of the English 
bank Barings in 1994, the bankruptcy of the large German company 
Metallgesellshaft in 1993, the ‘mother of all municipal defaults’138 in Orange 
County in 1994, and the much-lamented failure of the hedge fund Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998.  All of these examples involved the use of 
derivative financial instruments, and each shares a similar common feature in the 
speculative way in which these instruments were used, contributing to their 
unpredictable collapses.  
 
This chapter focuses on the example of the former American energy giant Enron, 
and how it used OTC derivatives to first “boom”, and then “bust”.  Like the 
other examples cited above, the nature of Enron’s demise is the subject of much 
debate, and many do not accept that derivatives trading can be seen as the key to 
why it became bankrupt.  However, this thesis argues that the case of Enron 
demonstrates how OTC derivatives trading is mis-represented by the models 
upon which current theories of “risk management” are based, and how, without 
                                                 
137 For an overview of aspects of historical financial crises, see Chancellor, Devil Take The Hindmost: A History 
of Financial Speculation, Galbraith, A Short History of Financial Euphoria, C. P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and 
Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Revised Edition ed. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1989; 
reprint, 1989). 
138 Gill, "Finance, Production and Panopticism: Inequality, Risk and Resistance in an Era of Disciplinary 
Neo-Liberalism," p. 69. 
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the state intervention that followed, systemic risk was a very real possibility.  First, 
this chapter outlines why Enron is an important case to consider, by 
documenting the scale and scope of Enron’s empire and the “costs” of its 
demise.  Second, this chapter documents how Enron came to trade so heavily in 
OTC derivatives, and gives a brief history of the company and of key 
developments in Enron, including its creation of new derivatives markets.  Third, 
it assesses different ways to explain the collapse, arguing that derivatives were 
instrumental to the demise of Enron.  Finally, it asks what this assessment means 
for an understanding of risk management analysis and practices with regard to 
OTC derivatives trading, as well as the regulatory responses discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
Why choose Enron as a case study? 
Like all good stories, Enron provides a host of enticing themes.  The world’s 
largest corporate bankruptcy is a story of greed, deception, corporate 
incompetence and risk management failure on a massive scale.  Of course, it’s 
only a good story if the reader is not one of the many so adversely affected by 
this giant non-fiction work.  It is the last of these themes that provides the basis 
for the analysis of this chapter, though, interestingly, it is the one given the least 
attention in the numerous articles and analyses attempting explanations for 
Enron’s demise.  The following account illustrates why the theme of financial risk 
management is indeed so important to understanding the fall of Enron. 
 
Following the demise of the giant energy company Enron, Frank Partnoy, a law 
professor, submitted testimony to the US Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs in January 2002.  He commented on the Enron collapse and the role the 
company’s use of derivatives played in that collapse.  To illustrate the importance 
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of the Enron case, he provides a comparison with the much-noted hedge fund, 
Long-Term-Capital-Management. 
According to Enron’s most recent annual report, the firm made more money 
trading derivatives in the year 2000 alone than Long-Term Capital Management 
made in its entire history.  Long-Term Capital Management generated losses of a 
few billion dollars; by contrast, Enron not only wiped out $70 billion of 
shareholder value, but also defaulted on tens of billions of dollars of debts.  
Long-Term Capital Management employed only 200 people worldwide, many of 
whom simply started a huge hedge fund after the bailout, while Enron employed 
20,000 people, more than 4,000 of whom have been fired, and many more of 
whom have lost their life savings as Enron’s stock plummeted [in 2001]. … In 
short, Enron makes Long-Term Capital Management look like a lemonade 
stand.139 
 
The implications of the collapse of Enron are obvious for those who have been 
directly affected, as Partnoy notes above.  And the comparison with LTCM is a 
salutary one for those interested in the role of derivatives in the international 
political economy, as much focus has been given to LTCM and its group of 
“financial superstars”.  LTCM has also been described as the ‘epitome of 
scientific finance’140, illustrating just how much faith is put in the ability of highly 
sophisticated financial risk management systems to predict and/or prevent 
financial collapse.  Though Enron did not profess the same expertise as LTCM, it 
did develop and use complex derivatives in innovative ways to create markets and 
speculate on weather and energy uncertainties.   
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January 2002 [cited 5 June 2004]); available from http://ssrn.com/abstract=302332. 
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A preliminary note about these aspects of the Enron case is perhaps apt.  Media 
coverage of Enron’s bankruptcy focused around a few key figures, such as CEO 
Kenneth Lay, and the accounting firm Andersen’s.  This is understandable for a 
couple of reasons.  First, fraudulent accounting was carried out at Enron, and 
there has since been a great deal of enquiry into this issue.  This raises interesting 
issues of classification in accounting systems, though this is not central to the 
argument of this thesis.  But secondly, and I think more importantly, derivatives 
were rejected as the real issue too quickly to allow US policy makers to assess 
situations such as Enron in more critical terms.   
 
As Partnoy notes, ‘Enron is largely a story about derivatives’.141  He argues that a 
‘close analysis of the facts shows that the most prominent SPE [Special Purpose 
Entities] transactions were largely irrelevant to Enron’s collapse, and that most of 
Enron’s deals with SPEs were arguably legal, even though disclosure of those 
deals did not comport with economic reality.  To the extent SPEs are relevant to 
understanding Enron, it is the derivatives transactions between Enron and the 
SPEs – not the SPEs themselves – that matter.’142 
 
Noting the various and widespread impact of the Enron collapse, ‘American 
taxpayers are potentially on the hook for $1.059 billion in OPIC [Overseas 
Private Investment Corp.] loans and insurance policies for 12 active projects in 
which Enron is one of the sponsors’143.  The international impact was felt 
immediately.  ‘Fallout from the collapse of the US energy trading company Enron 
                                                 
141 F. Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of 'May' (Villanova University School of Law's 
Law Review Symposium Issue, 2003 [cited 1 June 2004]); available from 
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142 Ibid.([cited). 
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resulted in the loss of more than 1,000 jobs within the group’s UK operations’144.  
Importantly, ‘Enron had nearly 20% of the British energy trading market’145 and 
many UK companies faced losses because of contracts with the US group.  One 
notable example it that ‘Centrica, the British gas group, said its exposure to 
Enron totalled around £30m.’146 
 
Normally commercial banks and insurers avoid backing long-term projects in 
emerging markets (many of them in the developing world), 147 however, Enron 
pursued these markets vigorously, thereby increasing both the riskiness of its 
derivatives contracts, as well as spreading the impact of its demise to the third 
world as well.  The spread of Enron’s empire is impressive:   
OPIC’s [Overseas Private Investment Corp.] portfolio of active Enron projects 
includes deals in Guatemala (fiscal 1992); the Philippines and Argentina (1993); 
Dabhol, India (1994); Colombia and Turkey (1994); Turkey (1995); Venezuela, 
Brazil and the Philippines (1998); Brazil and Bolivia (1999); Phase 2 of Dabhol 
(1999); and Guatemala (2000).  OPIC provided additional funding or insurance 
for existing projects in countries like Turkey, while financing or underwriting 
more than one project in other countries.148 
 
The overall impact of Enron’s collapse cannot be understated.  Enron left behind 
approximately $25US billion in debts, and approximately 20,000 workers around 
the world lost their jobs.  Its shares became worthless.149  ‘Many banks were 
exposed to the firm, from lending money and trading with it.  JP Morgan 
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admitted to $900m of exposure, and Citigroup to nearly $800m.’150  As Dodd 
puts it, ‘Enron is the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, and it will inflict 
substantial damages on U.S. banks, broker-dealers (who are already being sued 
for under-writing currently worthless Enron securities), insurance companies and 
pension funds that invested directly in Enron, energy companies, many small and 
large investors, and Enron’s own employees.’151
 
 
The interest of the Enron case to this thesis lies in the way Enron developed 
trade in OTC derivatives and shifted from the relatively concrete role of being an 
energy trader to the far more abstract role of a trader in energy-based derivatives.  
A brief history of Enron will help illustrate the extent of these developments, as 
well as their link to deregulation in the US energy sector, and the sheer scope of 
Enron’s “empire”. 
 
How did Enron come to trade in derivatives?  A brief history of Enron 
Enron came into existence in 1985 with the merger of Houston Natural Gas and 
Omaha-based InterNorth.152
 
  Originally involved in power and natural gas liquids 
in North America alone, Enron executives and energy lobbyists pushed for 
deregulation of the energy sector, advocating that more open competition would 
be better for companies and consumers in general.  Deregulation of the energy 
sector brought about two things: first, deregulation brought a lot of new suppliers 
of energy sources into the market; and second, the price of energy became more 
volatile.   
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As a result of deregulation of energy markets, Enron, among other companies, 
was able to create new markets, including futures and other derivatives markets, 
both for the purposes of hedging its own bets against changes in the uncertain 
new deregulated energy markets, and as a trader in the energy derivatives market 
more generally.  This began in the 1980s primarily with the use of futures markets 
to insure against price fluctuations in gas-generated energy.  Due to the 
deregulated market the use of such futures appeared a prudent, as well as 
profitable, approach for both Enron and the rest of the financial market.   
 
At its height, Enron controlled a quarter of all gas business in the US.153
situated itself as one of the most important market makers in weather 
derivatives, which allow weather-sensitive industries (the ice-cream company 
being a quintessential example) to hedge against adverse weather.  It has recently 
been asserted that the market in weather risk is experiencing exponential growth, 
and one provider of these products writes that “an estimated 70% of all 
businesses face weather risk and, as one might expect, weather risk extends 
across geographic market divides.”
  
Following the logic that so many companies apply in a situation of newfound 
success, Enron sought new ways of creating energy-related products, expanding 
their derivatives market to include steel and coal.  By the end of the 1990s Enron 
was even providing derivatives to hedge against external factors such as “weather 
risk”.  This may have been a smart business move for the energy giant, as Enron 
had  
154
 
 
That Enron was involved in derivatives trading in energy-related products is 
perhaps not so surprising, but what is worthy of note is that Enron was moving 
further and further away from its role as an energy company towards one of a 
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trading company.  Jeff Skilling, former chief executive and financial innovator for 
Enron, is said to have wanted to rid Enron of its physical assets.  This would 
have left Enron in the business of trading financial contracts in the energy market 
alone.  However, Enron was also using its newfound financial significance to 
move into water markets in the UK, and into power generation in India.155  
Importantly, though, Enron did not enter these market based on surplus profits it 
had made from its expansion, but instead ‘used debt to purchase a large amount 
of plant, equipment, and inventory’156 in a relatively short space of time.  
Expansion into both the UK and India was made possible by bank loans and 
debt issuance, producing a high debt-to-equity ratio ‘that was partially hidden 
from investors through the partnerships known as “special purpose entities”.157
 
 
The relationship between accounting and derivatives is also made particular 
interesting in light of the Enron case.  Piga discusses how derivatives are used to 
‘window dress’ their public accounts for the purpose of disguising budget 
deficits,158and Hosking discusses how ‘Enron used energy derivative to flatter its 
profit-and-loss account.’159 Enron ‘used derivatives [...] to hide losses suffered on 
technology stocks.’  Enron also ‘used derivatives [...] to hide debt incurred to 
finance new businesses.’160
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A key liberal economic principle is that there needs to be open information for a 
“free” and “fair” market to operate.  This applies to financial securities as well, 
meaning that a company or individual cannot trade based on information it has 
that is not available to the rest of the market.  But ‘Enron’s dual role as energy 
supplier and dealer enabled it to have an advantageous “view”.  It had more 
information on the market that enhanced its ability to earn speculative profits 
trading against other sophisticated and unsophisticated counterparties in the 
markets.’161
 
 
In November 1999 EnronOnline was launched as a global commodity trading 
site and Enron positioned itself as, what is creatively called, a “new economy” 
company.162  Including its general expansion of financial markets Enron was able 
to use financial innovation to improve its position with regard to reported taxable 
income and avoided specific rules in the natural gas and electricity markets.  
Complete bankruptcy examiners report of how Enron used derivatives runs to 
several thousand pages.163
 
  This is tantamount to the intricate accounting details 
that are central to the liberal regulatory understanding of this bankruptcy, with 
the issues of transparency and accountability at the top of their checklist. 
Enron’s share price was also completely out of synch with what its “real” value 
should have been.  In liberal terms, this would have been corrected eventually 
(and in an extreme sense, it was when Enron was declared bankrupt), however, 
neither the market nor Enron’s directors viewed it as overvalued.  The issue of 
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transparency is certainly relevant in liberal eyes.  But a more critical question 
relates to whether this type of market structure, so open to the speculative whims 
of people who may not operate according to strictly “rational” logic, is capable of 
providing the checks to stop the sort of “detached” valuation that leads to such 
unstable prices. 
 
Another key point, that relates to OTC derivatives in general, is that Enron 
created new markets through its creation of derivatives markets through its 
EnronOnline trading operations.  Not only was Enron responding to the “risks” 
in the current market, but it was also creating new markets, with new risks.  In 
this regard, some argue that Enron is significantly different to LTCM, for 
example, which ‘did not create markets but merely sought to gain by trying to 
exploit pricing irregularities in markets that already existed.’164
 
  However, it should 
be noted that LTCM was also in the business of actively creating financial 
markets, as all trade in derivatives is. 
Simply put, Enron went from being involved primarily in the fundamentals of the 
energy business to primarily trading in derivatives.  ‘Enron’s reported earnings 
from derivatives appear to be more imagined than real.’165
Enron derivatives traders faced intense pressure to meet quarterly earnings 
targets imposed directly by management and indirectly by securities analysts who 
covered Enron.  To ensure that Enron met these estimates, some traders 
apparently hid losses and understated profits.  Traders apparently manipulated 
  In actuality, Enron’s 
position was extremely volatile, and its staff began to lie about the profitability of 
its derivatives trading.  Attempts were made to hide this volatility. 
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the reporting of their “real” economic profits and losses in an attempt to fit the 
“imagined” accounting profits and losses that drove Enron down.166
 
 
Interestingly, the accounting practices related to derivatives trading for Enron 
were not as “factually” certain as one might expect.  ‘Instead of recording the 
entire profit for a trade in one column, some traders reportedly split the profit 
from a trade in two columns.  The first column reflected the portion of the actual 
profits the trader intended to add to Enron’s current financial statements.  The 
second column, ironically labelled the “prudency” reserve, included the 
remainder.’167  ‘In essence, traders were saving for a rainy day.  “Prudency” 
reserves would have been especially effective for long-maturity derivatives 
contracts, because it was more difficult to determine a precise valuation as of a 
particular date for those contracts, and any “prudency” cushion would have 
protected the traders from future losses for several years going forward.’168
 
 
Other examples of “creative accounting” practices in relation to Enron’s 
derivatives trading include its mismarking of “forward curves”.  Enron’s investors 
essentially valued the same market twice – ‘once in the company’s calculation of 
profits and once in the multiple the stock market applied to them.’ 169
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discussion of the creative ways in which accounting can be used to back up 
derivative trading that is not necessarily viable, highlight the complexity of any 
regulatory mechanism.  If OTC derivatives are traded liberally, and without the 
many regulations that are applied to exchanges, then “controlling” the effects 
these instruments have on the entire financial market is highly problematic. 
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One of the more honest accounts of the Enron case, points out a fundamental 
point with regard to the nature of business in a liberalised and deregulated market 
economy.  ‘The solution is not to invent ever more sophisticated measures of risk 
or ever more elaborate means of parcelling it out to others.  It is to face up to the 
inherent riskiness of business activity and to understand where the vulnerabilities 
lie.’170
 
 
A critical evaluation of Enron 
Explaining the cause for Enron’s collapse is in one way relatively simple: like all 
financial crises before it, Enron’s demise came about as a result of too many 
people cashing in on their debt speculations at the same time.  Because Enron did 
not have enough underlying assets or securities to offset these “calls” on Enron’s 
bluff, the value of Enron’s weather derivatives essentially became nothing.171
 
 
The value of Enron, like all the derivatives trading it was involved in, depended 
on the market assessment of Enron’s worth – in other words, an aggregate of 
individual investors demonstrating their faith that Enron is a good company that 
is profitable and likely to continue being so.  However, as Enron became less 
involved in the “productive” side of the energy markets, and more involved in 
derivatives markets, the value of which were far more abstract than the energy 
products Enron traditionally traded in, Enron’s financial position became 
increasingly left to the whims of the financial market.  This might have been fine, 
as long as Enron could rely on its risk management models to adequately predict 
significant risks to their OTC derivatives trading.   
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The question then is: why was the collapse so unpredicted, in spite of the 
powerful risk management tools employed by Enron? 
Energy policy affects derivatives mainly through its impacts on the underlying 
commodity and transportation (transmission) markets.  Commodity markets 
with large numbers of informed buyers and sellers, each with multiple means of 
moving the commodity to where it is needed, support competitive prices.  
Derivatives for managing local price risks can then be based on the overall 
market price with relatively small, predictable adjustments for moving the 
commodity to local users.  Federal energy policy has a significant impact on 
competitors’ access to transportation (transmission), on the volatility of 
transmission charges, and therefore on derivative markets.172
 
 
The second point argued by Partnoy is ‘that the regulatory response to Enron 
was in large part misguided because it focused too much on the conventional 
story.  If the conventional story about Enron is correct – then the prescriptions 
that follow from Enron’s collapse, if any, should relate to the regulation and 
disclosure of derivatives.’173
 
 
He argues that this second point is important as it raises the issue of how 
‘interested private actors quickly capture the agency rule-making process’, and are 
able to persuade US Congress to make more stringent recommendations for 
derivatives regulation than those already suggested by the SEC.174
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of vested interests appears valid, as ‘even after intense media scrutiny, 
173 Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of 'May' ([cited). 
174 Ibid.([cited). 
92 
congressional hearings and other governmental investigations, most of the firm’s 
derivatives dealings remain unpenetrated.’175
 
 
In discussion how derivatives trading was documented by Enron, Partnoy says 
that ‘Enron’s risk exposure to derivatives was disclosed in limited ways, but 
arguably was consistent with prevailing standards of practice, which required 
disclosure of only “reasonably likely” contingencies.  Overall, Enron’s disclosure 
practices were driven by accounting rules and did not necessarily comport with 
economic reality.’176
 
 
Partnoy argues that the derivatives problem at Enron goes much deeper, though.  
‘If Enron had been making money in what it represented as its core business, and 
had used derivatives simply to “dress up” its financial statements, this Committee 
would not be meeting here today.  Even after Enron restated its financial 
statement on November 8, 2001, it could have clarified its accounting treatment, 
consolidated its debts, and assured the various analysts that it was a viable 
entity.’177  Partnoy asks why it could not.  Simply put, because ‘most of what 
Enron represented as its core businesses were not making money.’178  Dodd 
argues that ‘Enron illustrates the problem with the laissez-faire approach to 
financial markets.  Safeguards must be put in pace first so that they precede 
market activity.  Once a crises emerges there is little that can be done.’179
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Partnoy also makes clear the point that ‘Enron’s trading operations were not 
regulated, or even recently audited, by U.S. securities regulators, and the OTC 
derivatives it traded are not deemed securities.  OTC derivative trading is beyond 
the purview of organized, regulated exchanges.  This Enron – like many firms 
that trade OTC derivatives – fell into a regulatory black hole.’180
Enron was a financial institution, and by all appearances a large one.  However, 
it was subject to no federal regulation as a financial institution.  The quarterly 
reports it filed under the securities laws pertained to Enron only as a corporation 
in general.’
 
181  Therefore, because of the way OTC derivatives markets are 
framed in the US regulatory system, Enron was able to continue trading in 
derivatives, and essentially avoid the many checks on “recognised” financial 
institutions, such as ‘basic safety, soundness, and transparency requirements that 
Enron and similar [OTC] derivatives dealers are not.182
 
 
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000 also played an 
important role in the reduced level of prudential regulation in the OTC 
derivatives markets that Enron was trading in.  ‘It reduced transparency and the 
government’s surveillance abilities over exchange-traded derivatives, and it 
completely eliminated or “excluded” federal derivatives regulation of the [OTC] 
market.  Enron operated in that completely deregulated environment.’183
 
 
However, neither Dodd nor Partnoy are willing to view the risk management 
models themselves as problematic.  Their contribution lies in recognising an 
element of ideological commitment to financial liberalisation and deregulation 
that has pervaded policy in countries such as the US for the previous thirty years.  
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This is still essentially a discussion for experts to take part in though, and they are 
also essentially “problem solving” accounts in that they do not address the nature 
of the risk management practices that they themselves are questioning. 
 
This self-regulation of OTC derivatives markets has been encouraged where neo-
liberal attempts to keep government out of financial markets have prevailed.  This 
is a movement both within states that have pushed a neo-liberal political agenda 
for some time (such as the US and the UK), as well at more international levels. 
At the international level, the most prominent and influential institution is the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).  This organisation 
has accepted as unavoidable the role of these internal risk assessment models in 
setting reserve requirements. In proposals for a new Basel Capital Accord, which 
were drafted in 2001 and which are currently under review with a view to 
implementation in 2006, banks have a choice whether to use a standardized 
approach (devised by the committee) or their own internal risk estimates for the 
calculation of the three risk categories which determine the level of capital 
reserves to be held by financial institutions (credit risk, market risk, and 
operational risk).184
 
 
‘More generally, the BCBS increasingly negates the need for a broader discussion 
on the possibilities, merits, and politics of current developments in mathematical 
risk modelling.’185
 
  The following discussion of risk models used by Enron may 
make this stance appear “imprudent”, at best. 
As noted in the previous chapter, key modes of governing practice in finance are 
through the way risk is neatly bounded, and is attached to certain things.  Enron 
used the Black-Scholes model and Value-at-Risk models to help it predict market 
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trends.  By analysing probabilities to future events, the VaR can provide 
numerical basis for decision-making.  Because the VaR is ultimately reliant on the 
normal distribution (i.e. a belief that there is a general law to be followed), main 
criticisms of VaR are for its underestimation of the chances of extreme and 
unexpected events.  As de Goede notes, ‘[l]eaving aside the question of the 
accuracy and availability of all the historical data required, it does not take a 
mathematical genius to realize that this strategy allows for little consideration of 
the occurrence of unprecedented events’186
 
.  This has important implications for 
situations where multiple-event hazards occur simultaneously.  For example, 
Barings certainly had a rogue trader to deal with, but it is not clear how successful 
he would have been had the Kobe earthquake not struck at such as 
“inopportune” moment. 
It is important to consider in the case of Enron what risks – or uncertain events –
its risk models could not account for.  Quantifiable risk have become essential to 
modern financial markets, however, as the relationship between seller and buyer 
relies so heavily on these standardised, abstract, and objectified numbers, the 
models have created increasing importance for themselves.  That these 
mathematical models might be largely contestable (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) does not stop them from becoming central to financial decision making 
if enough of the “right” people believe them to be of use.   In the case of Enron, 
financial derivatives were developed by EnronOnline and, because of their central 
(almost monopolistic) role in this part of the global financial economy, the rest of 
the financial market relies on these numerical models as well.  That these are 
taken for granted by many financial experts speaks volumes about the way 
“scientific” risk management practices are carried out. 
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Also, ‘[b]y accepting and formalizing banks’ internal risk management models, the 
BCBS’s proposals for the new Capital Adequacy Accord legitimate these financial 
practices.’  Adding a feminist analysis, she notes that ‘The identity of the 
masculine financial risk manager – the late-modern master of the future and 
imperial adventurer – is now underpinned by scientific authority and 
mathematical models, which appear as profoundly a-political.’187
 
 
De Goede notes that ‘financial risk management does not just react to but creates 
particular definitions of insecurity.  There is a circular argument propping up the 
financial sphere: while pretending to eradicate uncertainty from business 
ventures, finance identifies and invents more and more possible uncertainties to 
be hedged.’188
 
  This might also be understood according to the logic of capital 
expansion that Marxists find convincing. 
‘The politics of risk’, argues de Goede, ‘figure in the Enron scandal in two, 
interrelated, ways.  First, Enron’s ambitions to be an important player in the 
financial markets led the company to diversify into offering complicated risk 
management products.’189
 
  This might be likened to Beck’s notion that risks are a 
‘bottomless barrel of demands’ – i.e. that they can create risks ad infinitum – and 
that this is possibly infinitely profitable.   
Disagreeing with the direct link between the creation of new weather markets and 
Enron’s demise,’ de Goede argues that, ‘while potentially profitable, the 
increasing commercialisation of uncertain futures carries risks of its own.  In 
particular, the successful marketing of risk management products requires cultural 
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parameters that see it as morally and economically compulsory to be insured 
against that risk in question.’190  She goes on to note that ‘The second way in 
which the Enron scandal illustrates the problematic of politics of modern risk 
management is that it has become increasingly difficult to know the overall risk 
exposure of large financial institutions at any point in time.’191
 
 
‘Rationality and risk calculation, while unable to reveal the future, provide the 
“guarantee that even if things go wrong, one can have acted correctly.  They 
immunise decision-making against failure”’ 192
 
  Therefore, while increasing 
financial volatility and systemic risk, the legitimacy given to financial experts 
remains intact.  That there have been a number financial crises, and that each 
large collapse requires some form of market intervention from the state (be it to 
ensure market failure does not occur, or, less likely, to ensure that pensions tied 
up with the financial market are not lost), raises important political questions over 
the regulatory role of the state. 
It is important to recognise the social and moral role of risk management in a 
case such as Enron.  As de Goede notes, ‘[t]he identification and classification of, 
and attempts to insure against, dangers which lie at the heart of risk management 
entail a normative judgement on what kind of life is worth preserving or 
protecting, and which dangers are most urgently studied and expelled.’193
                                                 
190 Ibid.: p. 199. 
  This 
point is crucial.  There are competing conceptions of humans beings at stake 
here, and the question of which we prefer has important implications for politico-
economic processes and beyond.   
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The issue of classification in accounting systems is also important to consider.  
Specifically, Enron used derivatives and special purpose vehicles to manipulate 
its financial statements in three ways.  First, it hid speculator losses it suffered on 
technology stocks.  Second, it hid huge debts incurred to finance unprofitable 
new businesses, including retail energy services for new customers.  Third, it 
inflated the value of other troubled businesses, including its new ventures in 
fibre-optic bandwidth.  Although Enron was founded as an energy company, 
many of these derivatives transactions did not involve energy at all.194
 
 
There is also a more difficult element to this issue of accounting classification that 
makes legal and economic accountability a tenuous line to follow.  As 
MacKenzie, following Wittgenstein, points out in his interpretation of the 
“ethno-accountancy” of OTC derivatives in Enron, following a rule in 
accounting is an ambiguous and problematic area, especially when it plays such a 
central role in a self-regulated market.195
 
 
The way in which Enron created new derivatives markets also raises issue over 
the normalising disciplinary structures in international finance.  This is a question 
of analysing human behaviour.  Is there an objective basis for an analysis of 
financial crises, or does human behaviour alter depending on the ideational and 
material context?  If it is the latter, then one issue for the prevention of financial 
crises is to educate the people involved in derivatives trading and to provide 
information and signals to avoid the “emergence” of such euphoric episodes that 
appear again and again throughout financial history.  
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Objective and reliable financial risk analysis of the kind that can predict financial 
crises as a result of OTC derivatives trading is not possible unless there are clear 
laws of human behaviour that can be modelled.  If a social constructivist line is to 
be taken, it is more likely that advances in more sophisticated mathematical 
models and derivatives instruments will increase volatility as much as they 
provide greater levels of accuracy within their own epistemological framework. 
 
Enron is a good case in point.  The development of complex forms of weather 
derivative, for example, not only made it possible to give the impression of 
insuring against an uncertain future, but the development of sophisticated 
derivatives and financial models provided the basis for the kind of security 
required for the majority of market-actors wanting to know that their business 
would not be adversely affected by extreme weather changes.  The cultural faith 
in these sophisticated tools was enough to encourage a wide range of global 
actors to engage in OTC derivatives contracts.  Importantly though, and 
paradoxically, the security provided by the development of these new tools of risk 
analysis provided those with speculatory capital a new market in which to profit.  
Key in this case is that Enron was one of the largest speculators.  As one 
commentator put it, ‘derivative contracts formed a Gordian knot at the financial 
heart of a company that was once America’s seventh largest and is now its biggest 
bust.  Those who have chuckled at the regulators’ apparent obsession with threat 
posed by the phenomenal growth in the use of derivatives should recollect the 
jibes and blush.  Not that regulation comes out of this affair with any credit.’196
 
 
Moreover, the role of the state in preventing market failure is evident with Enron, 
as it was with the case of LTCM.  ‘Federal overseas economic-development 
agencies have financed or underwritten 18 Enron Corp. projects, exposing U.S. 
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taxpayers to a total of more than $1.73 billion in potential liability, according to 
agency officials.’197  Importantly, though, the state did not step in to bailout 
Enron and protect the many pension schemes, workers investments and what 
used to be state infrastructure of the energy market in the US.  The politics of 
privatisation and deregulation are stark in this regard.198
 
  
Despite the demise of Enron itself, this is unlikely to be the end of innovation in 
the derivatives energy market.  As chairman and chief executive of 
Environmental Financial Products noted in 2002, less than a year after Enron’s 
collapse, ‘[w]hile the halcyon days of Enron captured huge amounts of attention, 
the second type of market architecture quietly proceeded to grow, transform and 
mature into a deep market that is effectively filling the gap left by Enron’s 
collapse.’199  Making reference to the traditionally multilateral, “voice-brokered” 
type markets, the New York Mercantile Exchange and the International 
Petroleum Exchange (IPE), Sandor notes that ‘OTC markets continue to thrive 
and are being transformed by the introduction of new approaches to trading.’200  
Further, he sees indications ‘towards a “fusion” of these two types of 
OTC/multilateral markets.’201
 
 
Interestingly, though, rather than offer scepticism of OTC derivatives markets 
and a call for regulatory change, Sandor sticks with the extreme liberal line that 
the market is likely to learn from its own history, and that the ‘self-regulating 
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markets may again enjoy expanded benefits from the market confidence provided 
by their systems of rules, checks and balances and exposure to external 
inspection.  The results are greater profitability for the survivors and more 
efficient markets.  This ultimately leads to lower transaction costs.  Improved 
efficiency in these markets will help ensure economically rational allocation of 
energy resources.’202
 
  The faith in human beings as calculating is obviously a 
difficult assumption to shake off for those with such a vested interest in this 
particular type of market system.   
Consider, by contrast, Galbraith’s notes on the nature of what he calls financial 
euphoria: 
the extreme brevity of financial memory.  In consequence, financial disaster is 
quickly forgotten.  In further consequences, when the same or closely similar 
circumstances occur again, sometimes only in a few years, they are hailed by a 
new, often youthful, and always supremely self-confident generation as a 
brilliantly innovative discovery in the financial and larger economic world.  
There can be few fields of human endeavour in which history counts for so little 
as in the world of finance.203
 
 
That historical knowledge should count for so little, is compounded by what 
Galbraith calls ‘the specious association of money and intelligence.’204
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  The 
rationalist notion of the division of labour, which provides the basis for cultural 
faith in the risk analyst as expert, as well as the cultural institution of the 
corporation, informed by neo-liberal ideology, provide further reasons for 
financial caution.  Galbraith’s third point is that ‘we compulsively associate 
unusual intelligence with the leadership of the great financial institutions – the 
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large banking, investment-banking, insurance, and brokerage houses.  The larger 
the capital assets and income flow controlled, the deeper and presumed financial, 
economic, and social perception.’205
 
 
These themes are not restricted to the case of Enron.  In fact, very recently the 
state-controlled Chinese Aviation Oil (CAO) had a US$550m derivatives trading 
loss.  The Chinese government blamed the company for “irregular 
speculation”.206
 
  It is too early to comment on the particulars of this case or 
exactly what the implications might be, however, it is clear that large financial 
losses from derivatives trading is not a thing of the past. 
Conclusion 
The case of Enron demonstrates how OTC derivatives can be used in a 
deregulated market economy.  It is clear that these tools of risk management can 
very easily become tools for creating risk in a deregulated market economy, as 
critics of speculative capital have argued for some time.  The chapter has also 
illustrated that the policy responses within the US has not focused on the role of 
derivatives, but has instead framed the collapse as an issue of accounting 
standards and white-collar crime.  More fundamentally, however, the faith in 
“experts” of risk management appears to have remained un-dented, in spite of 
the fact that the complex mathematical models for risk analysis do not adequately 
predict the financial behaviour of OTC derivatives traders where increasing 
volumes of trade and a multitude of different energy markets and “invented” 
products increase the complexity at a more systemic level.  The question of how 
best to regulation OTC derivatives is therefore left largely in the hands of the 
“experts” of financial risk management, in spite of a poor track record where 
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macro-financial risk is concerned.  From this critique of scientific risk 
management comes an interesting query for the question of regulation:  what is 
the relationship between the epistemological faith in objectivist rationalism to 
understand and explain financial processes such as OTC derivatives trading, and 
the vested interests of state and expert actors in policy circles. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
HOW IS THE QUESTION OF REGULATION TO BE FRAMED? 
Introduction 
Given the salutary lessons learned from the case of Enron discussed in the 
previous chapter, the question of how much “control” there is over global 
finance in general and OTC derivatives in particular is clearly a valid one.  A key 
question is now: how can some form of effective regulation be developed and for 
whom?  This chapter begins by assessing what the question of regulation means 
in the context of global finance.  This leads to a discussion of the various analytic 
languages IPE offers to demonstrate how various rationales inform the logic of 
regulatory response.  In outlining these analytic languages the discursive 
relationship between power and knowledge highlights the way risk management 
practices, such as derivatives trading, are set up.  By arguing for and against 
regulating OTC derivatives trading, this chapter puts forward an argument that 
the dominance of problem solving theory in risk management practices makes 
some form of state or inter-state regulation highly desirable, but any such 
regulation will also require a serious re-evaluation of the role of the “expert”, and 
the technical knowledge they rely on, in the international financial system.  
Finally, after assesses the question of regulation with regard to broader politico-
economic, politico-strategic, politico-social and environmental criteria, the 
chapter puts forward options for different types of regulation. 
 
What does regulation mean in global finance? 
The question of regulation is essentially a question of power and control.  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to regulate is ‘to control, govern, or 
direct by rule or regulations; to subject to guidance or restrictions; to adapt to 
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circumstances or surroundings.’207
 
  Regulation is generally understood in IPE as a 
question of state regulation, of imposing laws on a set of practices to ensure that 
a rule is followed, or at least not broken.  The reason for regulation is usually not 
arbitrary, as reason dictates that there must be logic to any rule, informed by 
moral, ideological, or technical knowledge.  Therefore, any consideration of 
regulation in international financial markets needs consider the role of the State, 
of institutions (both national and international), and of knowledge that informs 
both regulatory policy and financial practices.  
As was explored in the introduction, each of the different theories of IPE sees 
differing conceptions of human nature, or human nurture depending on a range 
of material and/or ideational factors, as more important that the others.  Each 
analytic language, therefore, puts forward a different ontological understanding of 
the social world to be understood.  This is an important point to make clear, as 
each analytic account, while often purporting an objective analysis, uses these 
assumptions of human nature/nurture to make normative claims over how 
politics and policy should proceed.  Therefore, Outlining the various analytical 
takes on this question clarifies the differing emphasis each approach places on 
states, markets, information, class, expert discourse, etc. 
 
We have established that neo-liberal cases for self-regulation, which are 
particularly dominant in informing national and international policy prescriptions, 
base their economic analysis on what they term “technical” knowledge, devised 
and purported by specialist “experts”.  Theirs is a type of analysis that is based on 
supposedly “objective”, “unbiased”, and “scientific” explanations of financial 
behaviour.  They might agree with critics that economists and financial analysts 
track records are not perfect, but they would argue that theirs is as good analysis 
                                                 
207 OED, ([cited). 
106 
as there is likely to be, and better than the alternative of giving up to the 
unpredictability and uncertainty of the market.  Following from this position of 
faith in “expert” discourse, neo-liberals are particularly concerned with the 
“inefficiency” any excessive regulation of OTC derivatives would result in.  This 
inefficiency, neo-liberals argue, would be seen in increased bureaucratic “red 
tape” and would not make the global financial market any safer.  Moreover, it is 
argued that derivatives are needed in the global financial market, as they offer 
insurance against all sorts of market risks that go with it.  How else are we to deal 
with the uncertainty of economic globalisation?  
 
Furthermore, neo-liberals argue that new forms of financial regulation are neither 
desirable nor feasible as ways to cope with financial disorder.208  ‘Any attempt to 
regulate the international financial markets in a way which would replicate the 
regulation of national financial markets would be doomed to failure, because it 
would require the creation of a world government.’209
 
  This follows from the 
liberal logic, that views cooperation (from individuals, firms and states) as only 
following from mutual benefit.  Therefore, the authority of any such global 
regulatory body would be difficult to enforce, not to mention the numerous 
“inefficiencies” from bureaucracy that such an arrangement would result in. 
There are alternatives to this neo-liberal approach of self-regulation, however, 
and a substantial debate has now developed within IPE to address the question 
of regulation of the international financial system.  ‘The debate is concerned with 
the question of the desirability of the scope and the purposes of regulation in the 
new global economy, but underlying it is a much deeper and older question – 
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whether regulation of a capitalist economy is feasible at all.’210
 
  Furthermore, 
Gamble argues that the difference in this debate is not over whether or not there 
should be a regulatory regime, but where it should be located.  
‘The supporters of new forms of regulation believe that the neoliberal view of 
regulation and state action, which has been dominant in the past three decades, is 
far too pessimistic about the possibilities of building on cooperation between 
states to create international regimes which can effectively regulate.’211  For 
instance, John Eatwell argues that a lack of regulation of the international 
financial market will lead to increased pressures on those states that benefit least 
from international capital mobility leading to a revival of protectionist and 
isolationist policies.212
 
  In other words, the future of a liberal world order will be 
put at risk if the continued self-regulation approach to financial trade, such as that 
in OTC derivatives, is left to carry on.  Here, Eatwell, like many other moderate 
liberals, argues for the incremental development institutions to move to more 
effective monitoring and control of global capital flows.  For instance, the role of 
institutions such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) is viewed as a 
good example of an institution that operates outside of state control, but is able 
to offer respected opinion on financial stability that is taken seriously by both 
states and firms. 
Girvan and Griffith-Jones agree about the need to regulate the financial markets, 
but they argue for more inclusive political forms to manage the regulation, and 
for regulation to be significantly tighter.  They argue for an International 
Monetary Authority, which would supersede the national monetary authority of 
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existing states by issuing a global single-currency, imposing taxation on short-
term financial flows and controlling international financial flows.213
 
 
By contrast, the mercantilist is concerned with the economic welfare of their state 
as it affects state sovereignty in terms of economic decision-making and military 
expenditure and power politics in general.  Believing that humans are essentially 
bad and that the nation-state is the natural and legitimate actor in the 
international political economy, mercantilists push for greater state control of the 
way financial markets operate.  Accordingly, OTC derivatives may not be 
desirable at all, or there may be some kind of state tax imposed on every trade to 
dissuade speculatory trading.  This would almost certainly have the effect of 
limiting the development of new types of derivative financial contracts, ensuring 
their purpose was more closely aligned to that of insurance against market 
uncertainty.  However, a state is only likely to move for this kind of regulatory 
protection if they perceive a risk to their economic power to exist.  In the case of 
most Western states, including the US, this has not been the case.  Rather, the 
type of reactive response to financial crises, that was discussed in chapter one, 
appears to be the norm rather than the exception in the history of financial 
capitalist expansion. 
 
Furthermore, for state actors to have that kind of autonomy of financial capital 
would require a significant shift in power relations towards state-control of 
economic processes in general.  The issue here is that if the state is to regulate in 
isolation from moves to international regulatory institutions and the will of large 
financial institutions, whether this would really protect the single state that had 
made that move.  The complex web of finance that was discussed in chapter one 
means that any move to reverse this liberalised and integrated financial market 
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would require a forceful and revolutionary movement of more than state-led 
scope.  As Coleman notes, 
If [the] state is capable only of supervising and regulating the activities of the 
given global firm within its own territory, it will have a very partial, and arguably, 
inadequate view of the financial health of that firm.  What is more, the nation-
state might worry it its supervision and regulation were to appear too demanding 
to a given number of global firms, they might simply transfer aspects of their 
business to another financial centre where the regulatory touch was more to 
their liking.  The signing and execution of over-the-counter derivatives contracts 
can be physically located in a number of places.’214
 
 
The issue here is one of “competitive laxity” among national regulatory 
authorities, as the era of economic globalisation means that state policy follows 
the market rules of competitive advantage and disadvantage.  However, the state 
is certainly not “powerless” in this situation, as Weiss has explained using the 
notion of ‘transformative capacity’ to ‘help explain why some states are more 
successful than others in steering economic adjustment.’215  For Weiss, the focus 
ought to be on how state actors and industry representatives coordinate and agree 
to cooperate towards broader goals.  ‘Of central importance is the state’s ability to 
use its autonomy to consult and to elicit consensus and cooperation from the 
private sector.  Through its linkages with key economic groupings, the state can 
extract and exchange vital information with producers, stimulate private-sector 
participation in key policy areas, and mobilise a greater level of industry 
collaboration in advancing national strategy.’216
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However, as Coleman notes in his analysis of global governance initiatives, 
‘governments have difficulty cooperating in the international realm and many of 
them are unwilling to extend their rule-making capacity beyond the nation-state.  
Both of these factors are relevant to the governance of OTC derivatives.’217  
Cooperation between states is made further problematic due to the complex 
nature of the OTC derivatives market and the technical nature of issues such as 
disclosure, transparency, and the actual derivatives products themselves.  With 
general state support for market forces, states are not so concerned with a bit of 
“market discipline”, however, the issue of systemic risk is one that states are 
anxious about.  For that matter, so are private actors,218
 
 which makes the 
moderate liberal argument for increased cooperation between states and markets 
on regulatory issues valid, provided they agree on the nature of the problem. 
By contrast, Marxists are keen to emphasise how tied up with the interests of 
capital (including finance capital) state structures are.  In this regard, and because 
Marxists believe that the structures of capitalism determine the way humans 
behave, any real reform of financial capital flows is more likely to be temporary, 
and will fail to restrain the development and trade in financial contracts such as 
derivatives.  Moreover, classical Marxists are likely to welcome derivatives as they 
are seen to speed up the collapse of wider capitalist processes – an inevitable, but 
not necessary predictable outcome of these unsustainable politico-economic 
practices.219
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These issues certainly make clear the plight of state agency in a globalising 
financial economy.  To frame this as a reified dichotomy between state and 
market forces is not only over-simplistic, however, it is also dangerously 
inaccurate.  For instance, according to the more critical approach offered by post-
modernists and post-structuralists, the relationship between knowledge and 
power is so intertwined that “risk” is already a form of regulation.  This is a 
crucial point to note as a critique of neo-liberal economic theory, as the case for 
regulation is essentially set up on the basis of “what the risks are” from 
derivatives trading.  In this respect, we are left with the experts telling us the 
credit risks, legal risks, counterparty risks, etc., that exist in the derivatives market.  
In other words, the type of social and economic practices, accounting 
classifications, and tools of risk management have in-built regulatory mechanisms 
in that they develop certain logics in practice.  Key here are the normalising-
disciplinary practices that Foucauldians220 talk about, and Gill highlights in his 
discussion of market civilisation.221
 
 
In this regard, the role of OTC derivatives fits within wider questions of 
governance and control in the international financial system, as Deuchars notes.  
‘[T]he drive to standardise and rationalise financial systems immediately raises 
questions to do with power. Whose standards are to be implemented? Whose 
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best practices should be adopted? How were these best practices derived, and are 
they universally appropriate at all places at all times?’222
 
  Therefore, the 
power/knowledge relationships that constitute the practices of risk management 
do regulate the behaviour of financial players at a more subtle level.  Thus, 
“control” of financial processes needs to take into consideration the ways in 
which government and international institution policies, social processes, market 
structures, as well as the construction of new financial instruments and financial 
risk management technologies affect behaviour in global derivatives markets. 
This understanding of governance as operating at multiple levels and through 
diffuse means contributes to other critical understandings of governance 
provided by authors such as Hewson and Sinclair.223  Langley’s analysis of the 
‘everyday life of finance’ outlines the importance of understanding the 
governance of large groups of people  more in terms of the complex social 
relations that are played out here.  In this regard, ‘what IPE scholars tend to label 
global financial governance (i.e. the institutions of the “new international financial 
architecture”) already and at once assumes and constructs the identity of the 
community that is to be governed. The construction of the identity of ‘the 
investor’ and the rational ‘good financial citizen’ discussed above – prioritised and 
naturalised in a disciplinary discourse - is, then, central to global financial 
governance.’224
 
 
The question of control: structure or agency? 
The central importance of the stability of the international financial system is 
noted by Tickell and Clark.  ‘To a greater extent than, at least, any other over the 
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past 60 years, a complex series of interlinked policy decisions and economic 
circumstances means that the health of the global economy relies upon the 
systemic stability of the financial sector.’225
 
  The key question this thesis has 
posed is: is control at a structural level possible in global OTC derivatives 
markets? 
The question of control is also a question of human agency, be it that of the 
individual, of the firm, or of the state. Is it possible, for instance, for the actions 
of a few to alter the overall outcome of a process in a way that is understood in 
clearly causal terms?  In other words, can the financial world control it’s own 
collective destiny?  Or, more specifically, can individuals and firms control their 
own destiny in the global OTC derivatives market.  The analysis provided in this 
thesis so far suggests that the answer is no.  This is in clear antithesis to the 
argument put forward by neo-liberals that financial liberalisation (including the 
liberalising of global OTC derivatives trading) is necessary, and that risk 
management “experts” are those best equipped to deal with the task of regulating 
their exchange.  They may well be the best equipped, however, the evidence of 
their “control” over such processes at a systemic level is undermined by the 
collective actions of many financial players, and that at a macro level “risk” is very 
difficult to document in calculable terms.  In other words, systemic risk is very 
difficult to predict. 
 
More of the global economy is becoming embroiled in this global financial 
“casino”.  Controlling this globalised system relies on constructing value and 
disciplining behaviour at a number of levels, from the “high levels” of financial 
policy and regulation, to the regulation of accounting practices, to the 
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construction of classificatory systems and risk management techniques.  It also 
relies on disciplining the behaviour of an increasing number of people 
throughout the world, so as to make sure they comply by the rules of the financial 
market place that is replacing more traditional mediums of exchange. 
 
Risk managers have highly complex formula upon which to base their decisions 
for trade in large volumes of derivatives contracts.  Very few people actually 
understand the complex formula at the heart of these derivatives contracts, 
instead relying on the assumption that everyone else believes these to be accurate 
representations of the “risks” involved in trading in derivatives.  “Risk” is 
understood to be something that exists exterior to and independent from the 
analysts gaze.  It is certainly not accepted that “risk” is influenced by the theory of 
“risk” itself.  Moreover, very few people involved in risk management practices 
understand the construction of value and classificatory systems at the heart of 
central models such as the Black-Scholes model.  Instead, what Maurer calls the 
“black-box” of finance is left unquestioned.  Inside this black-box resides a 
formula that encompasses the historical construction of statistical knowledge and 
the classification of human behaviour based on the assumption of human 
behaviour as driven by rational, self-interest, narrowly understood. It hides the 
bell-curve, the assumption of the l’homme moyen that is implicit in liberal analysis, 
and the notion that these are factual accounts of financial behaviour, objectively 
understood and independent of value-laden bias. 
 
We’ve also noted serious limits to the way risk (understood in the objectivist 
rationalist terms that are prevalent in expert and policy circles) is able to provide a 
framework for prediction and control at complex, global, and systemic levels.  
Therefore, we are left with a few different options.  First, can the risk models be 
adapted to deal with the increasing complexities of the global financial market?  If 
115 
so, then we need to give even more control to the financial experts, and possibly 
provide regulatory oversight to make sure transparency and accountability remain 
key parts of the financial service.  This option stays within the liberal framework 
of allowing financial markets to operate freely, without hindrance from the state. 
Second, if the risks cannot be known at this complex and systemic level, then we 
have to ask ourselves what role we are to give these financial experts in society.  
Do we, a) provide them with the lessons of the limits there are to objectivist 
rationalism in understanding uncertainty, allowing for financial players to 
recognise more clearly the limits to the “safe trading” they can carry out.  Perhaps 
this will lead to more diversified investments and self-imposed restrictions on 
financial speculation?  However, if financial history is to have any credence, it 
would appear that expect restraint where the potential for quickly-gained profit is 
concerned is optimistic at best, or, perhaps more accurately, just downright 
ignorant to the driving motivators of greed and crowd behaviour.   
 
There is a key political question here of power, and who has it.  We have already 
established that the “experts” of financial risk management may not have the 
kind of control neo-liberal analysts believe them to.  We might even go so far as 
to call this the neo-liberal “illusion of control”.  However, when was the last time 
you saw a financial analyst or economist lose their job as a result of incorrect 
predictions? Moreover, due to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a 
relatively small number of large financial institutions, most states will not allow 
them to go bankrupt in the way they allow small businesses to go bankrupt.  
Rather, as was the case in LTCM, the state will often step in to ensure that 
damage to “fundamental” international financial institutions is limited. 
 
What other options do we have that might offer better control and a greater level 
of “certainty” at the macro level of the international financial system?  What 
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about through further calls for self-regulation?  In other words, through agency 
rather than structure?  In this liberal vein, what is required is better transparency 
and accountability of derivatives practices.  Therefore, greater disclosure and 
capital requirements might become part of regulatory policy.  This may well 
prevent instances such as Enron, Barings and Orange County becoming 
exacerbated, but this approach ignores the nature of “financial euphoria” that 
surrounds new financial products such as derivatives.  In this regard, a belief that 
trade in OTC derivatives can follow a path of continued growth with relatively 
small systemic risk ignores historical and contemporary evidence of trade in 
derivatives and financial instruments and the crowd mentality that has been 
evident in all of these episodes.  This is an essential element of human nature that 
“scientific” risk models leave out of their equations.  Rather, in a liberalised global 
economy that allows for betting on almost any kind of asset or security price 
imaginable, and for such massive gains, the general trend of increased derivatives 
trading and its tenuous construction of value is likely to continue. 
 
What about through international institutions?  There are significant multi-lateral 
moves to increase cooperation on international financial regulation, such as the 
Basel II Accord.  And that there has been a dramatic growth in international 
organisations and NGOs, makes for strong argument here.226
                                                 
226 N. Woods, "Globalization and International Institutions," in The Political Economy of Globalization, ed. Ngaire 
Woods (New York: St Martins Press, 2000), p. 204. 
  The role of the 
G20 in particular has been touted as a key institution for focusing on aspects of 
financial stability, economic growth and development.  However, any significant 
multilateral accords need to get the full backing of the US, as this is the key state 
to consider.  The US, under the Bush administration in particular, has made clear 
its preference for free market policies, and a push for deregulation of financial 
markets, as evidenced by the CFMA of 2000.  Secondly, most international 
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institutions look to carry on the current trend of liberalising global derivatives 
trading, and therefore ignore the fundamental problem that lies behind the 
problem of system risk – that of the sheer volume and speed of OTC derivatives 
trading, and the increased volatility resulting from this. 
 
Another option purported by moderate liberals some kind of Tobin tax on each 
derivatives contract.227
 
  The idea of the Tobin tax is to give a disincentive to 
“speculative” trade in OTC derivatives, by making a small percentage charge on 
each contract.  There are two benefits to such an approach.  First, the money 
gained from this tax can be channelled to any number of “good causes”, or even 
channel this money into state funds to prepare for large-scale bankruptcies that 
threaten various public savings and pensions schemes.  Second,  it is believed that 
the disincentive of Tobin tax would be enough to curb a great deal of speculative 
trade, and that this would limit the volatility that currently prevalent in global 
OTC derivatives trading.  This is not a measure on its own, and again it is a policy 
that has to fit within moves for greater multilateral cooperation, however, it does 
avoid the problem of having to comprehend global trade in systems terms. 
Of course, the most extreme option would be to ban trade in OTC derivatives 
altogether.  This would eradicate the problem of systemic risk created by trade in 
derivatives.  There is the liberal argument, however, that derivatives in their role 
as a form of risk management, do offer insurance against the uncertain market 
forces of a deregulated global financial market.  For instance, currency volatility 
offers as much of a risk to many banks and firms.228
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OTC derivatives would best be part of a general move to regulate the global 
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What other criteria for regulation? 
There are many measures by which to assess the purpose of regulation.  Scholte 
sees global finance as needing to meeting goals of ‘efficiency, stability, social 
justice, ecological integrity and democracy.’229
 
  This next section briefly assesses 
each of these criteria with relation to trade in OTC derivatives.   
This thesis has so far focused on the stability issue, as this is key not only to neo-
liberal accounts but also to the more critical approaches.  Therefore, let us first 
assess this question of regulation with relation to systemic risk.  According to the 
analysis of this thesis, volatility of the OTC derivatives market is impossible to 
escape at the macro level.  This means that we have to live with uncertainty all the 
time.  There is a very interesting question to be asked here regarding how much 
(economic) uncertainty a society can bear, and at what consequence?230
 
  While the 
global trade in OTC derivatives appears very abstract from the lives of most 
people, the increasing presence of global finance in everyday lives and the liberal 
push for “market freedoms” means that the question of the stability of OTC 
derivatives markets is a politico-social one as well as a politico-economic one. 
The measure of efficiency is a key one to liberal accounts of money and finance.  
OTC derivatives, in this regard, offer private market actors a form of insurance 
that is more flexible and “responsive” that anything offered under a more 
socialist or regulated economic environment.  However, “efficiency” will depend 
on the measures one has for it.  In the case of Enron, energy and OTC 
derivatives markets were deregulated partly in order to increase the overall 
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efficiency of the system creating growth and innovation, to use liberal parlance.  
This logic extended to India and the UK among others, where water and energy 
plants were subjected to the benefits of such free market flexibility and expertise.  
However, the spectacular demise of Enron and the gross social and economic 
effects it has had on these markets certainly calls for a critical framing of the 
notion of “efficiency”. 
 
In this regard, the economic human rights of citizens to “free and fair” markets 
might well be seen to undermine other rights to control over local water supplies, 
energy technologies and any other areas of social (as well as economic) concern 
that trade in OTC derivatives can become embroiled in.  As with many of these 
criteria, these are questions that are intricately tied up with broader processes of 
economic globalisation.  The power that is given to large Western banks and 
firms in this structure, and through OTC derivatives markets, disproportionately 
advantages the.  This is of particular concern to a growing number of people, as 
the ties between every day life and global finance renders the question of 
democratic control seemingly problematic.  Furthermore, and for similar reasons, 
the ecological integrity of speculative trade in OTC derivatives is questionable.  
For instance, the recently approved Kyoto protocol creates an opportune 
moment for options trading in carbon emission credits.  Here, as with other 
social and political concerns, the ecological impact of such trading is far from a 
priority of OTC derivatives markets.  
 
Therefore, given that there is no “natural” logic to the evolution and role of 
derivatives in capitalism; given that there is little evidence to suggest that 
derivatives can be “controlled” by some form of “expert” self-regulation due to 
the speculative way in which these instruments are used; and coming from a 
critical perspective that views the speculative use of OTC derivatives trading in 
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more parasitic than productive terms; the option of significant state and inter-
state regulatory intervention appears apt. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the predominance of liberal modes of self-regulation in 
OTC derivatives markets around the world.  This is particularly the case in 
countries such as the US, the UK and Singapore, which are key financial centres 
and the focal point for most trade in OTC derivatives.  This chapter has argued 
that, rather than “expert” knowledge of financial risk management providing a 
solid and legitimate basis for self-regulation of OTC derivatives trading, the 
control that can be achieved via human agency appears severely undermined by 
the scale and scope of global finance.  Therefore, the call for greater regulation of 
OTC derivatives trading at an inter-state level appears legitimate, based on a 
range of criteria, including financial stability, social justice, ecological integrity and 
democracy. 
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C o n c l u s i o n  
WHAT NOW FOR OTC DERIVATIVES TRADING? 
This thesis has addressed the question of whether over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives should be regulated, and how best to do so.  The question of 
regulation is ultimately a political one, though, given the dominant politico-
economic structures that drive financial policy, arguments tend to be based on 
the advice of “experts” in the technocratic structure of the neo-liberal market.  In 
this regard, most discussion of financial regulation in past decade has been in 
response to concerns over control at the systemic level of the international 
financial system.  At base, therefore, the question of regulating OTC derivatives is 
one of structure versus agency, in that it is a question of how control can be 
maintained over politico-economic processes at the international, or even global, 
level.  How these politico-economic processes are understood depends on how 
we understand the global financial market.  This thesis has employed a variety of 
analytic languages to illustrate the limits to a liberal account, informed by 
objectivist rationalist analyses, of the politico-economic dimension of world 
affairs. 
 
Chapter one showed how the question of regulation is contextualised within a 
specific market structure, that not only measures the need to regulate based on 
what is perceived to be a “risk” to market structure, but that this market structure 
also serves specific interests and ignores many others that well might be 
considered more important by large proportions of the world’s population.  
Importantly, the way the notion of “risk” is framed here provides a key basis for 
expert discourse, and is central to an understanding of the way in which the 
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market is understood by them, and, just as illuminating, the ways in which the 
market is not understood. 
 
The purpose of chapter two was to outline the logic of derivatives trading, and to 
critically assess how derivatives are understood.  By drawing on post-structuralist 
interpretations of “risk” and finance, the chapter illustrated how scientific risk 
management relies on social constructions, and that while they tend to be very 
effective at smaller and more immediate levels of analysis, such as those provided 
in basic credit risk analysis, claims to objectivity, calculability and predictability at 
the macro level appear undermined, as is evident in attempts to quantify systemic 
risk in OTC derivatives trading.  
 
Chapter three illustrated, by way of case study, some of the limits to objectivist 
rationalism in the analysis of trade in OTC derivatives.  By outlining the way 
Enron developed and used derivatives contracts, and how it relied on specific 
financial risk models, and also taking into account the regulatory context of the 
US and other international financial markets, the chapter showed some of the 
following key problems: trade in products that are beyond its expertise; growth in 
trade of OTC derivatives contracts at a rate too great to be monitored by either 
the Enron corporation or state and inter-state regulators; problems of accounting 
classification; potential for systemic risk, and the role of the state post-collapse of 
the Enron empire.  It also raised issue with responses offered by economic and 
state experts. 
 
Chapter four critically assessed the question of regulating OTC derivatives trading 
in light of the analysis presented in this thesis.  By asking what regulation means, 
we can move beyond basic state versus market dichotomies that tend to 
oversimplify the complex human interactions that are going on here.  The post-
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structuralist critique offers us a way of understanding the power/knowledge 
contests that constitute an important part of the contextualisation of present-day 
derivatives trading.  The notion of “risk”, in this regard, already forms an 
important way of regulating financial practices, both through the creation of 
expert discourse that informs the behaviour of financial actors through the faith 
provided in complex mathematical models that frame their possible actions 
within a rationalist framework, and through the normalising disciplinary effects of 
the wider politico-economic structures that provide rules to be followed by the 
wider operations of society.  
 
The dominant accounts of international political economy, in particular neo-
liberal accounts, offer what Cox calls problem-solving theories.  They are 
problem-solving because they focus on the behaviour of agents within a 
particular ontological framework.  Derivatives trading, which is a logical 
extension of the liberal market structure, is understood by most theorists and 
analysts in primarily rationalist terms.  Because humans are assumed by liberals to 
be primarily calculating, liberal models analyse and predict human behaviour 
according to models that make use of historical information and derive likely 
events from it.  They are used to predict what prices for assets and securities 
might be at a particular date in the future, laying the foundation for the derivative 
financial instruments that are traded between those wishing to insure themselves 
against the uncertainty of the market. 
 
The way in which these financial contracts are traded (while remembering that 
the underlying assets or securities are often not traded) raises question as to 
whether “risk management” or speculation is the driving force behind the 
phenomenal growth in the volume of OTC derivatives over the last thirty-odd 
years.  Not only is the value of derivatives increasingly abstracted from the value 
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of the underlying assets, but the trade in these instruments is in such great 
volume and velocity that one has to ask how best to understand and explain the 
behaviour of the financial actors involved.   However, understanding the “nature” 
of derivatives trading requires moving beyond a simple dichotomy of “insurance” 
versus “speculation”.  The construction of risk management techniques within 
the processes of financial capitalism has been the subject of analysis from post-
structuralist perspectives that seek to understand the role of a particular expert 
discourse in the creation of an “illusion of control” over global financial 
processes. 
 
If a technocratic society is desired, then experts are required.  This thesis 
demonstrates that “experts” need to be more critically, and socially aware, of the 
relevance of their models for risk management.  However, “experts” may not be 
capable of providing the kind of knowledge necessary for control in a deregulated 
financial market, due to the unpredictable nature of human behaviour. 
 
While other analytical approaches might not offer an alternative to the neo-liberal 
models of risk management employed in the many financial houses across the 
world, a “critical theory” approach, including the analyses of post-structuralist as 
well as other social constructivist, feminist, neo-Marxist, ecologist and indigenous 
perspectives, illustrates some key limits to the problem solving theories that focus 
only on individual behaviour.  By drawing from critical histories, for instance, 
theorists of IPE are able to show that the basis for the many analytic models used 
by risk analysts, do not account for the way their “facts” are historically and 
socially constructed.   
 
The conclusion of this thesis is that control over OTC derivatives trading is not 
possible in a self-regulatory system that relies on experts, as neo-liberals think.  
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History tells us that prudential restraint is not a strong feature of human 
behaviour where there is perceived to be an easy way of making money.  Trade in 
OTC derivatives provide exactly this kind of opportunity, and the cultural 
framework that both legitimises and encourages this activity is unprecedented.   
 
But what kind of regulation should be employed depends then on what is 
possible and what is desirable?  It is possible to have state, inter-state or even 
global regulation of derivatives trading, if the right political institutions are set in 
place.  The likelihood that they will be will depends on what one believes of 
human nature and nurture.  What is desirable depends on the end one seeks.  I 
would argue that OTC derivatives trading in such large volumes and at such great 
velocity do not offer any significant benefit to the wider market.  This conclusion 
might be likened to that of Marx, who believed that financial speculators were 
parasites on society, offering little and gaining much in terms of financial 
reward.231
 
  My analysis parts company with Marx’s in terms of its analytic 
interpretation of the nature of market practices, however, I do believe it is 
necessary to restrict the role of such unproductive and uncreative pursuits and to 
meet more fundamental needs and wants than those of desire and greed. 
                                                 
231 K. Marx, Capital, trans. David Fernbach, vol. 3 (New York: Vintage, 1981) Ch. 33. 
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